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INTRODUCTION 
 
“If a time when we can borrow money in a currency we print ourselves for the long term at 3% and 
the construction unemployment rate is in double digits is not the moment to repair Kennedy Airport: 
When will that moment ever, ever be?” 
Lawrence Summers (2014) 
 
What Lawrence Summers suggests seems reasonable at a first glance, yet the implication goes 
against the call for fiscal consolidation that can currently be heard all across the globe. Inter-
est rates in the world’s major economies have been low for the past years since the financial 
crisis in 2008/2009, and benefits can be reaped from this. In Germany, the state is estimated to 
have saved over €100 billion since 2008 due to lower interest rates.1 According to the Bun-
desbank (2013), other governments have also benefitted from this development as a conse-
quence of declining debt services. This eases the pressure on the public budget in these coun-
tries and supports fiscal consolidation. In light of the recent sovereign debt crisis in the euro-
zone, austerity measures have been taken up by most countries to decrease the public debt 
level. These two effects complement each other and could potentially speed up the process of 
bringing down public deficits and debt-to-GDP2-ratios.  
Summers (2013, 2014) looks at this situation from another angle. Instead of letting low inter-
est rates help decrease deficits, he suggests taking advantage of the low price of borrowing 
money and letting the government spend it, stimulating the economy and inducing growth. 
Politically, public spending is a lot more desirable than austerity. The public will always pre-
fer voting for a candidate that wants to invest in infrastructure compared to a candidate that 
wants to raise taxes. However, the desirability of public spending is limited, as the experience 
in Europe has demonstrated. Too high a level of public debt can lead to sovereign defaults, 
and recovering from these will most likely put more strain on the public than fiscal consolida-
tion prior to a default. As can be seen in Greece at the moment, recovering from such a crisis 
comes at high costs.3 In the meantime, this issue does not only concern Europe.  
                                                          
1 Handelsblatt (2014).  
2 Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
3 For an investigation of the effects of fiscal consolidation on household income distribution for nine EU countries, see Avram et al. (2013).  
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The debt level of the United States of America (USA) is currently at over $17.6 trillion4, the 
highest it has ever been. Thinking back to what happened in Europe in the past years, this 
could be quite alarming. Taking advantage of the low interest rates to bring these numbers 
down seems like a sensible approach.  
It is therefore all the more surprising that several economists such as Lawrence Summers 
(2013, 2014) or Carl Christian von Weizsäcker (2014) argue in favor of public debt instead. 
They claim that – for various reasons – many economies are currently growing inefficiently 
because they have accumulated too much capital. This circumstance can then create a serious 
threat to prosperity that can only be resolved through public debt.  
Summers (2013, 2014) and von Weizsäcker (2014) are not the first economists to suggest that 
public debt is desirable. If a country has accumulated a lot of capital and as a result grows 
inefficiently – a state that is also referred to as overaccumulation – raising public debt levels 
is actually a feasible policy. However, if the economy is dynamically efficient, this will only 
increase the risk of sovereign default due to added pressure on the public finances because the 
debt has to be served later on. Knowing which state an economy is in is therefore crucial to 
determining the debt policy a country wants to implement.  
This thesis will investigate the circumstances under which public debt does (not) put an addi-
tional burden on future generations and assess whether these conditions are fulfilled for the 
OECD countries plus China. A new criterion that differs from the approaches used so far in 
the overaccumulation literature will be developed. Applying it to a wide range of different 
countries will allow for more general results to be obtained, broadening the spectrum of em-
pirical findings.  
The thesis is structured as follows: First, an overview of the theoretical background on over-
accumulation will be presented and a general criterion will be given to determine whether or 
not public debt constitutes a “free lunch”, meaning that it never has to be paid back. The sec-
ond chapter will review different empirical evaluations that have already been conducted by 
other authors and introduce the specific criterion used in this thesis. The analysis is described 
and results are presented in the third chapter, the discussion follows in the forth chapter. The 
conclusion sums up the findings and presents opportunities for further research.  
 
                                                          
4 Source: http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/graph/?id=GFDEBTN, effective September 2014.  
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Chapter 1: Overaccumulation, Ponzi Games, and an Economy with 
Land 
1.1. What is Overaccumulation?  
 
Overaccumulation is an important topic in the economics literature. Starting in the mid-20th 
century with articles by Malinvaud (1953), Phelps (1961, 1965), Diamond (1965), Cass 
(1972) and many more, the concept of overaccumulation and its causes and effects have been 
investigated more carefully and several theories that are now considered standard literature on 
the topic were developed.  
Put simply, overaccumulation occurs when an economy has accumulated too much capital. As 
a consequence, it is in a state in which lowering savings by raising consumption would benefit 
current consumers while not requiring a lower level of consumption later on, leaving future 
generations unaffected. Spending more money now would therefore not change the amount of 
possible consumption tomorrow. To demonstrate how this mechanism – which might at a first 
glance seem odd – works, a look at another standard model in basic macroeconomics can be 
helpful. Solow (1956) developed a framework for economic growth in which the economy 
eventually reaches a steady state, which is the case when all factor proportions stay at the 
same level over time. In its simplest case, a closed economy without government activity and 
without technological growth is considered. The single-good economy only has two input 
factors – capital K  and labor N  – and the output Y is either consumed or invested in the capi-
tal stock, which depreciates at rate  . The production function ),( NKFY   has standard 
neoclassical properties in that it has constant returns to scale, exhibits positive marginal prod-
ucts and a diminishing marginal rate of substitution. The wage w  is equal to the marginal 
product with respect to N  while the interest rate r  is equal to the marginal product with re-
spect to K . Let NKk /  and k  be k  differentiated with respect to time t  , keeping N  con-
stant. The net capital investment evolves according to 
(1) kksfk  )( ,  
where )(kf  is the production function per capita and s  is the rate of savings of the economy. 
A steady state is reached when 0k . Figure 1 shows how this steady state is determined 
graphically for two cases.  
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As shown in Figure 1, it is easy to determine consumption per capita 𝑐 and thus the amount of 
savings per capita from the graph. In his “Fable for Growthmen” Phelps (1961) derives a so-
called “Golden-Rule of Accumulation” which maximizes consumption in a Solow model and 
finds that in order to attain the golden rule, the rate of investment, which is equal to the sav-
ings rate s , must equal the competitive rate of profits, that is:  
(2) 
*Y
rK
sG

  
The first graph of Figure 1 shows an economy for which equation (2) holds and which is 
therefore in a state of maximum consumption. The second graph shows an economy with a 
savings rate higher than the golden rule level. This results in a higher capital stock, a higher 
output level, and a lower interest rate. On the other hand, per capita consumption c  is lower. 
It is easy to see that by decreasing the savings rate to the level of the left graph, consumption 
per capita can be increased for the time in which the decrease takes place and also all other 
periods following the decrease.5 This is because the economy has accumulated too much capi-
tal and can afford to decrease the capital stock. In the opposite case when the savings rate falls 
short of the golden rule level (the interest rate exceeds the golden rule level), it would need to 
be increased in order to achieve maximum consumption.  
                                                          
5 In the model, the transition from one steady state to another takes a long time as the capital stock decreases slowly.  
Figure 1 – Steady States in a Solow Model 
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However, this would mean a decrease in consumption until the new capital stock is built up 
that eventually allows higher consumption, leaving several generations with less to consume 
compared to their ancestors, as the adjustment to a new steady state does not take place im-
mediately. Solow’s (1956) simplified model can be extended to a growing economy with 
technical advancement without altering this result. A few years after his “Fable”, Phelps 
(1965) revisits the topic and proves that the golden rule path can also be found for un-
neoclassical models, using the Harrod-Domar model6, and investigates the role of technical 
progress. Relying on a proof by Koopmans (1963), he also shows that a growth path is dy-
namically inefficient when the interest rate is never equal or above the golden rule level, i.e. 
the capital-output ratio exceeds the golden rule level. Additionally, on the golden rule path 
that maximizes consumption, the golden rule interest rate is equal to the growth rate g  of an 
economy, given that this maximum is an interior one7. Dynamic inefficiency or overaccumu-
lation thus means that due to the fact that gr  ,  there is a way to change the capital stock in 
such a way that no person is made worse off and at least one generation is made better off, 
which would then constitute a pareto improvement.   
The Solow model is extremely limited in representing real economies, for example it assumes 
a savings function that is exogenous and does not look at decisions at the household level. A 
more extensive model that endogenizes the savings rate with a microeconomic foundation 
was developed by Ramsey (1928) and later extended by Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1963). 
Looking at household decisions concerning ideal consumption and saving, which depend on 
the interest rate and utility function, the model derives a savings rate for the economy. This 
version of the model is a step closer to reality, which might indicate a higher relevance of the 
model when assessing actual economies compared to the Solow model. Allowing for the sav-
ings rate to be determined in a competitive economy yields an interesting result: Dynamic 
inefficiency is ruled out in the Ramsey model as the savings rate can never exceed the golden 
rule level. However, this result is due to mathematical assumptions that have to be made about 
the model, specifically the fact that households live forever and plan accordingly. The result-
ing budget constraints are only binding if the interest rate never falls short of the growth rate, 
see von Weizsäcker (1979, pp. 273).  
                                                          
6 The Harrod-Domar-model is an early post-keynesian economic growth theory developed by Roy F. Harrod (1939) and Evsey Domar 
(1946). It does not impose the neoclassical assumptions that the production function needs to be twice differentiable, strictly concave, and 
exhibit positive marginal products at all times. Phelps (1965, pp. 800) thus chooses this model to show that his results do not hinge upon 
these assumptions being fulfilled.   
7 The other possibility would be a corner maximum at 𝑘 = 0. This option is not of interest in this investigation, as it also implies zero pro-
duction and zero consumption and is thus trivial.  
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Therefore, as Romer (2012, p. 63) points out, for this type of economy the first welfare theo-
rem always holds: competitive solutions are pareto-efficient. But before one dismisses dy-
namic inefficiency as a theoretical issue without relevance for competitive economies because 
of this finding, a look at another standard model in macroeconomics – the overlapping genera-
tions model – is necessary.  
 
1.2. Dynamic Inefficiency in the Diamond Model 
 
The first one to show that dynamic inefficiency is possible in a competitive economy even 
with perfect foresight was Samuelson (1958). He examined a consumption-loan model and 
determined interest rates in this economy, assuming an overlapping-generation (OLG) model. 
In OLG models, individuals live for a limited amount of time only and make their consump-
tion decisions using utility maximization with that bounded horizon in mind. This is a differ-
ent approach and in direct contrast to the assumption in Ramsey’s model where households 
live forever. Another important difference is that in every period, new agents enter the econ-
omy, resulting in infinitely many households. Shell (1971, p. 1002) argues that dynamic inef-
ficiency in the OLG model is due to a “double infinity of traders and dated commodities”.  
Samuelson’s (1958) result was quite surprising, as it showed that even if individuals perfectly 
know about the future and act completely rational, their decisions are optimal for themselves 
but can lead to an inefficient growth path when aggregated, see Cass (1972, p. 220) and 
Scholten (1999, p. 138). Building on his work, Diamond (1965) developed an OLG model 
that confirms this result for steady state equilibria and examines the effect of national debt on 
utility in the efficient and the inefficient case. He shows that in the efficient case, national 
debt causes a decline in the utility of an individual while in the inefficient case it can either 
lower or raise the utility. He distinguishes between external and internal debt and illustrates 
that if only internal debt is used, this would raise utility if the economy has accumulated too 
much capital. This is the basis for the argument that inefficient economies should use gov-
ernment debt to absorb excess capital in order to return to an efficient growth path. However, 
it also shows that this is a dangerous policy if the economy was believed to be inefficient 
when it was really not.  
 7 
 
OLG models have since become a workhorse model in macroeconomics because they can be 
used for a wide number of research questions, such as the role of bequest motives8, the effi-
ciency of public pension schemes9, or even the optimal number of children10. It is also another 
step closer to modeling reality compared to the assumption that individuals live forever. Due 
to its high significance and versatility, the Diamond model will now be examined closer to 
show how overaccumulation can occur in an OLG model.  
In Diamond’s model individuals live for two periods. The population grows at rate n , so that 
tt NnN )1(1  . When they are young, individuals work and earn a wage, which is the mar-
ginal product of the production function ),()( 1 tttt KNFKF   with respect to labor 1tN . 
When they are old they don’t work anymore but still consume. They use their income from 
the first period to finance consumption and save for retirement, which they do through pur-
chasing bonds from firms. The firms issue the bonds to pay for investments and in the follow-
ing period redeem the bonds, paying an interest factor 1tR  which is equal to the marginal 
productivity of capital in equilibrium. They also pay wage rates in that period. Output tY  is 
thus produced using the young generation for labor and the capital stock tK , which is held by 
the old generation. The profit of the firms equals  
(3) .),( 1111 tttttt KRNwKNF    
The budget constraints of the households are  
(4) ttt wSC 
1  
(5) ttt SRC 1
2
1     
where 1tC  is consumption when young, 
2
1tC  consumption when old, tS  the amount of bonds 
purchased and tw  the wage received. A steady state is reached when all factor proportions 
remain constant. In this competitively determined equilibrium tt KS  .  
 
 
 
                                                          
8 See for example Barro (1974), Weil (1987), Abel (1987). 
9 See for example Aaron (1966), Breyer (1989). 
10 See for example Raut (1990).  
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Now let tU  be an individual’s utility in period t  given by 
(6) ,
11
12
1
11










tt
t
CC
U  1  0; >  
where   determines the elasticity of marginal utility. The higher  , the higher the individu-
al’s wish to smooth the consumption path.   reflects the pure rate of time preference. Substi-
tuting (5) into (4) yields the budget constraint 
(7) t
t
t
t w
R
C
C 


1
2
11  
In order to determine the optimal consumption path, tU needs to be maximized with respect to 
1
tC  and 
2
1tC . This can be done using the standard LaGrange method.  
(8) 


















1
2
11
12
1
11
11 t
t
tt
tt
R
C
Cw
CC
L 



  
Differentiating with respect to 1tC  and 
2
1tC , and solving for 
2
1tC  yields 
(9) 1
/1
12
1 t
t
t C
R
C

 






   
Substituting this into the budget constraint (7) and solving for 1tC , one obtains 
(10) ,
/)1(
1
/1
/1
1
t
t
t w
R
C






  
which, combined with (4) shows that 
(11) .
/)1(
1
/1
/)1(
1
t
t
t
t w
R
R
S

















 
The number of bonds bought by the households thus does not depend solely on the wage, but 
also the interest factor and the time preference. And what is more, the effect of the interest 
factor depends on  . For 1  the number of bonds bought will increase with a rising inter-
est rate. For 1  it will decrease, while for 1 , which is the case for logarithmic utility 
functions, the interest factor has no effect on the amount of saving at the household level.  
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With the wage rate and the interest factor both being equal to the marginal productivity of 
labor and capital respectively, the equation of motion for the capital stock crucially depends 
on the production function. Without further specification, it is not possible to find a general 
solution for the evolution of the capital stock. Therefore, an example following Homburg 
(2014) will now be used to illustrate the mechanisms in the Diamond model.  
Let 2 1
1ln  ttt CCU   and 
3/23/19)( tttt NKKF  . Labor is constant and normalized to unity. 
1
tC and tS  have already been determined for the general case. Plugging in 1  because of 
the logarithmic utility function yields 
(12) 




1
1 t
t
w
C  


1
t
t
w
S  
 
Using (5), 2 1tC  is easily determined to be 
(13) .
1
12
1

 
tt
t
Rw
C  
Firms maximize their profit   that is given as  
(14) tttttt KRNwNK 111
3/2
1
3/19    
Maximizing with respect to tK  and 1tN  yields 
(15) ,66 3/13/11
3/1
1 tttt KNKw 

  with ,11 tN  
(16) ,33 3/23/2 1
3/2
1



  tttt KNKR  with .11 tN  
As the utility function is logarithmic, the interest factor has no effect on the amount of bonds 
purchased, as can be seen from (12). However, the wage rate, determined through the capital 
stock from the previous period as shown in (15), sets the amount of saving and thus the next 
capital stock because 11   tt KS . Combining (12) and (15) one obtains 
(17) .
1
6 3/1
1


t
t
K
K  
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A stationary state is established when the capital stock remains unchanged, so solving for 
KKK tt 1  and substituting the result into (16) yields 
(18) 
2/3
1
6









K          and 
2
1 
R    
as the equilibrium capital stock and equilibrium interest factor.   
Due to the fact that this is a stationary state, the growth factor of the economy is 1G . The 
golden rule interest factor that maximizes consumption is therefore also equal to 1 and emerg-
es when 1 . For any 1  the economy will reach an inefficient stationary state because 
the interest factor will be smaller than the growth factor. A 1 , implying a higher prefer-
ence for present consumption, will keep the economy in an efficient state since the individuals 
will not save more than they would at the golden rule level. Table 1 provides numeric exam-
ples for the three cases.  
 75.0  1  25.1  
K  6.35 5.2 4.35 
Y  16.66 15.59 14.7 
C  10.32 10.39 10.34 
R  0.88 1 1.25 
 
Own calculation based on the example in the text. Values are rounded to two decimal points.    
 
As can be seen from these examples, a state of overaccumulation can occur if the time prefer-
ence is such that consumption of goods in the future is valued higher than consumption today. 
This result is quite intuitive. If individuals receive a higher utility from consumption in the 
future, like in the case of 75.0 , they will save more and the resulting higher capital stock 
will depress R , as can be seen from (18). Without any limitations on the value of  , overac-
cumulation cannot be ruled out. Setting boundaries for   would only decrease the scope of 
the model and there is no reasonable justification to do so. Thus, the standard Diamond model 
is prone to dynamic inefficiency.  
 
 
Table 1 – Capital Stock, Output, Consumption, and Interest Rate in the Diamond Model 
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1.3. Assessing Dynamic Efficiency 
 
Determining whether or not an economy is in a dynamically inefficient state is of great inter-
est for policy implications because it has drastic implications on the effect of these policies. 
Inspired by Phelps’ (1965) article on dynamic inefficiency, Cass (1972) explores the possibil-
ity of finding an observable characteristic of an economy that accumulates too much capital.  
His reasoning is as follows: If the economy is inefficient, one could simply decrease the capi-
tal stock and as a result consumption could be increased for the current period without dimin-
ishing it in the future. If no such reduction can be undertaken without bringing down con-
sumption in the future, a growth path is called dynamically efficient. Another way to put this 
is that an inefficient economy can achieve the same consumption path starting from a lower 
capital stock. He compares the “excess” capital over the efficient lower level of capital to a 
useless Swiss bank account where money is never taken out. Clearly, such a state is not desir-
able. Analyzing the effect of capital stock reductions over time, he derives the requirements 
under which such reductions are feasible and thus a criterion for dynamic inefficiency. The 
focus of this criterion lies on the eventual behavior of the net interest rate of the economy. A 
necessary condition for inefficiency is that the future value of a unit of capital in period 0 be-
comes zero in the limit, due to increasingly unfavorable terms of trade. A sufficient and nec-
essary criterion is that this deterioration in the terms of trade happens at a rapid rate. If this 
does not happen, the economy is efficient. Put differently in terms of interest and growth fac-
tors R  and G 11, the economy is efficient if the product TT GRGR // 22   diverges, see 
Homburg (2014, p. 19).  
Cass’ (1972) proof has been reproduced by many authors when extending the search for 
(in)efficiency criteria under different circumstances. While Cass (1972) described an econo-
my under certainty, Zilcha (1990, 1991) examined stochastic models that allow for uncertain-
ty. In his first paper, he focuses on a growing economy, whereas in his second paper he de-
rives necessary and sufficient conditions for inefficiency in a stationary model. While his cri-
terion reads slightly differently than the Cass (1972) criterion, the essence is the same. How-
ever, as was later pointed out by Rangazas and Russell (2005) and Barbie and Kaul (2009), 
there are several errors in Zilcha’s (1990, 1991) proofs with respect to the necessity and suffi-
ciency of his criterion.  
                                                          
11 Where Phelps uses interest and growth rates, Homburg (2014) uses interest and growth factors.   Interest/growth factors and inter-
est/growth rates are related as follows: R = (1+r) and G = (1+g). 
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The main result of these two papers is that Zilcha’s (1991) criterion for stationary economies 
is not a sufficient criterion for inefficiency. Nonetheless, the criterion is sufficient to assess 
dynamic efficiency. This is important because it means that the Cass (1972) criterion for effi-
ciency as a diverging series of the product TT GRGR // 22   is also valid in a stochastic sta-
tionary economy. Another extension confirming the Cass (1972) criterion was published by 
Balasko and Shell (1980) and deals with exchange economies.  
Also following the Cass (1972) line of argument, Homburg (2014) develops a criterion to 
assess dynamic efficiency that is quite general as it does not impose the otherwise often need-
ed Inada12 or boundedness assumptions. The model allows for population growth as well as 
technical change and linear production functions. His derivation will now be presented.  
Homburg (2014) examines a model with a homogenous output 0tY  that can either be used 
for consumption 0tC  or capital formation 0tK , where t  denotes the period. He disre-
gards market institutions, and capital depreciates fully. The capital stock and output have the 
following relationship: 
(19)   111   ttttt KCKFY  for ...,2,1,0t  
The marginal productivity of capital 1/)(  tttt RdKKdF , referred to as the interest factor, is 
strictly positive and the production functions )( tt KF  are time dependent. The growth factors 
tG  of the economy are defined as 1/  ttt YYG  and the output in period T  thus becomes 
(20) .... 231 GGGYY TT   
Suppose the economy is in a state of inefficiency. Then there exists a positive capital stock 
reduction 0t  that leads to an increase in consumption in period 𝑡 without negatively af-
fecting future consumption. If in 1t  on reduces 1K  by 01   this leads to an increase in 
1C  by 1 . As a result, the output in 2t  will fall by at least 12R  to a lower level compared 
to the path without the reduction. However, the consumption need not be affected if the inef-
ficient case truly holds. In order to keep 2C  at the same level, 2K  must be decreased by 
122  R . In 3t , 3Y  falls by at least 123 RR  and 3K  must be reduced by 1233  RR  if 
3C is to remain the same.  
                                                          
12 The Inada conditions go back to Kenichi Inada (1964) and state that lim
𝑘→0
𝑓′(𝑘) = ∞ and lim
𝑘→∞
𝑓′(𝑘) = 0, ensuring that the economy does 
not diverge (see Romer, 2012, p. 12).  
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The same logic applies to all periods after that, showing that the reduction in the capital stock 
at time T is equal to 123  RRRTT   . The upper limit for the reduction is the produced 
output in period T  so 231 GGGY TT  . This leads to 231123 GGGYRRR TTT     
and therefore 
(21) 
T
T
RRR
GGG
Y
...
...
32
32
11   for  ,3,2T  
If the reduction is feasible and 01  , the economy is dynamically inefficient. This condition 
is not fulfilled if the compound interest factor  
T
t t
R
2
 exceeds the compound growth factor 
 
T
t t
G
2
, which would lead the fraction on the right-hand side to approach zero in the limit, 
making 01  . Therefore, if 
(22) 0
...
...
32
32 
T
T
RRR
GGG
 for T  
the economy is dynamically efficient. No feasible reduction in K  is possible.  
In a steady state with fixed factor proportions and constant growth rates, this implies that 
GR   for the economy to be efficient, showing the connection to Phelps’ (1965) results. This 
reduces the assessment of dynamic efficiency to a comparison of interest and growth rates.  
However, as can be seen from (22), one needs to look whether or not R  exceeds G  in the 
limit when evaluating the efficiency of an economy. Only the eventual behavior of these vari-
ables matters. This means that the interest factor can fall short of the growth factor at times 
and that this can even be a state lasting for a long time, which might lead the observer to con-
clude that the economy grows inefficiently. But as long as the economy turns back to the case 
of GR   in the long run, dynamic efficiency is ensured. As it is impossible to determine the 
future path of economic indicators with certainty, this poses a problem concerning the relia-
bility of the results from an empirical comparison. Nonetheless, empirical tests can still yield 
credible results if one assumes that the relationship between R  and G  is a stochastic process 
that is ergodic.13 If it is, this would imply that the behavior of these variables observed in a 
sample on average converges to the behavior that can on average be observed over the entire 
horizon. Thus, if in a sample the average interest rate exceeds the average growth rate, the 
assumption of ergodicity leads to the conclusion that (22) holds, meaning that the economy is 
efficient.  
                                                          
13 For more on ergodicity, see Billingsley (1995). 
 14 
 
Ergodicity is therefore a useful concept when empirical tests for dynamic efficiency are con-
ducted. Homburg (2014, p. 16) and Barbie et al. (2004, p. 10) also explicitly make use of this 
condition.   
The past two sections introduced the Diamond model, showed how dynamic inefficiency can 
occur in an overlapping generations model and that an economy is dynamically efficient if 
GR   in the limit. The next section focuses on the consequences of dynamic inefficiency.  
 
1.4. Ponzi Games 
 
As has already been described, a state in which the economy has accumulated too much capi-
tal is not desirable to maintain, because the economy foregoes the potential of a higher con-
sumption that could be achieved at no cost. In addition, dynamic inefficiency enables asset 
bubbles, as was shown by Tirole (1985), and Ponzi schemes become feasible, which is basi-
cally equivalent, as O’Connell and Zeldes (1988) argue.  
A Ponzi scheme is characterized by the issuance of debt and then rolling it over forever, never 
having to serve it.14 As Romer (2012, pp. 588) explains, a Ponzi scheme in the Diamond 
model is feasible if the interest rate falls short of the growth rate. In this case, the government 
could raise a certain amount of debt at time 0 and issue new debt to pay for the interest and 
the principal of the original debt. The next time the debt is due, new debt will once again be 
issued to pay the principal and interest. That way, the value of the debt grows at the current 
interest rate. If this rate is below the growth rate, this implies that the output of the economy 
grows faster than the debt and the debt-to-GDP-ratio converges to zero. By playing such a 
Ponzi game, the government can reduce the capital stock and attain the golden rule level, thus 
eliminating the inefficiency. To do so they have to get the households to hold government 
debt instead of bonds by firms, reducing the investment in the capital stock. Due to the fact 
that the initial debt never has to be paid back, the possibility of a Ponzi scheme is often re-
ferred to as a “free lunch”. However, if the economy is dynamically efficient and the interest 
rate is above the growth rate, the debt grows faster than the output of the economy and has to 
be served sooner or later.  
                                                          
14 The concept goes back to Carlos Ponzi, after whom the scheme was named. In the 1920s, Ponzi owned a small loans company in Boston 
and received loans from customers promising to pay 30% in interest each month. He financed this interest by collecting more loans. The 
system collapsed when the income from new deposits fell short of the interest he had to pay (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005, p. 28). A similar 
scheme that attracted much attention in more recent times was the Ponzi game by Bernard Madoff. For more on the Madoff fraud, see 
Stowoly et al. (2014).   
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This result is important for policy implications. If an economy is dynamically inefficient, rais-
ing government debt is not only feasible but would also help the economy escape the ineffi-
cient state. Large budget deficits would then be beneficial to the economy as a whole. If the 
economy is dynamically efficient, such a Ponzi scheme cannot be successful and any debt 
raised will shift the burden of serving it into the future.  
The next section will introduce an extension to the Diamond model that introduces land into 
the economy with drastic implication for the dynamic behavior.  
 
1.5. A Modified Diamond Model – The Introduction of Land 
 
This section introduces a revised version of the Diamond model proposed by Homburg (1991, 
1992, 2014) that adds land as a production factor and shows that this renders dynamic ineffi-
ciency impossible. Thus, if land plays an important role in an economy, ignoring it could lead 
to wrong conclusions concerning policy implications.  
Going back in the economics literature, land used to be a standard ingredient for economic 
models before the 20th century, making up part of the classical factors of production – land, 
labor, and capital.15 Ricardo (1817), and Turgot (1770) are just a few authors who included 
land in their considerations. Nowadays, models that incorporate land are seldom developed in 
the field of economic growth. Homburg (1991) blames this development on the focus on 
steady state analyses within growth theories. As mentioned before, a steady state is defined as 
a state in which the factor proportions stay constant. In a model with land and population 
growth, the land/labor ratio as opposed to the capital/labor ratio will vary over time due to the 
fact that land is fixed in quantity whereas labor grows. This also means that the rent/wage 
ratio will differ, and the basis for deriving steady states no longer exists. It is therefore neces-
sary to look at arbitrary growth paths instead of steady states. This approach is mathematically 
more challenging and according to Homburg (1991, 2014) the main reason for abandoning 
land as a production factor in neoclassical models.  
 
                                                          
15 “The categories are characterized by a purely economic trait: they are respectively the suppliers of services of land, of labor, and of a stock 
of goods that is labeled ‘capital’. This seems to settle their role in production and, quite unbidden, the famous triad presents itself, the triad of 
agents, or factors, or requisites – or instruments (Senior) – of production” (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 531). In the past decades, this concept has 
been complemented by other factors. For a review and discussion on this issue, see Dean and Kretschmer (2007).  
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There are important insights to be gained from an analysis that includes land, as will be shown 
in this section. The central result was first discussed by Turgot (1770: 82ff.) and states that the 
interest rate in a stationary economy must be strictly positive due to a simple arbitrage calcu-
lation. A person can choose to invest capital in different ways, including a purchase of land 
that produces a revenue each year that shall be called the rent  , or lending it to other people 
at an interest rate r . Then, people have the choice to buy a certain amount of land at a price q
, collect the revenue and then sell the land at the exact same price one period later, or to lend 
the money for one period and earn an interest rate. If it is assumed that they have no prefer-
ence for either form of investing the money, the following equation must hold in equilibrium:  
(23) .1
q
q
r

  
Otherwise, arbitrage becomes possible. For example, if interest rates are lower, people would 
borrow money and invest it in land purchases, making more money from the land revenue 
than they have to pay back in interest. That way, they would be able to make money out of 
thin air, and this can clearly not be an equilibrium solution. The interest rate will have to ad-
just in accordance to (23) to make arbitrage impossible, based on the assumption that the in-
vestor is indifferent between the two options. Turgot (1770: 82) goes even further and states 
that a loan is much riskier than investing in land, owing to the threat that the debtor won’t be 
able to pay back the loan and default becomes necessary. Due to the risk associated with lend-
ing money, the interest rate r  must thus in fact exceed the return on land. Looking at (23) 
makes it clear: If the price of land and the revenue are strictly positive, which is in no way an 
unreasonable assumption to make, the interest rate must also be strictly positive. Additionally, 
it shows the direct relationship between r  and q . If a large number of land owners decide to 
sell their land, driving down its price, the interest rate must increase in order to keep lending 
money a feasible alternative to buying land. Or put differently: If the interest rate decreases 
and thus lending becomes less profitable, the price of land will increase to preserve sufficient 
investment options. This way, if the interest rate in a stationary state approaches zero – the 
golden rule level – land prices will be infinitely high, keeping the interest rate from ever fall-
ing below the growth rate. This mechanism provided by an alternative investment opportunity 
obtainable at all times keeps the economy from saving too much money, and thus accumulat-
ing too much capital.   
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Homburg (1992, 2014) extends this idea to an arbitrary growth path and confirms that, when 
land is taken into account, overaccumulation is rendered impossible. In his analysis, factor 
proportions are not fixed and price fluctuations are accounted for. In the earlier version of his 
theory, he shows that this result also applies under assumptions that allow for a high degree of 
heterogeneity when it comes to land qualities, household and firm preferences as well as tech-
nical progress. However, as this proof is quite involved and yields no additional insights rele-
vant for the scope of this thesis, the following verification will be taken from his recent arti-
cle, keeping in mind that compared to other growth models, the results do not rely on many 
assumptions.  
Building on the example explained in the previous section, a model with land is derived. 
Firms now also buy land L   that they need to produce their output and issue bonds to finance 
their investment. Land and Output are sold one period later and the bonds are redeemed. The 
profit   is now derived as follows 
(24)   )(,, 11111 LqKRNwLqLKNF tttttttt     for ,2,1,0t  
In accordance with the wage and the interest rate, the rent of land 1t  is equal to the margin-
al productivity of land  
(25) 111   tttt qqR  for  ,2,1,0t  
and, solved to parallel (23),  
(26) 
t
tt
t
q
q
R 111





 for  ,2,1,0t  
It can also be seen easily that 11 /)(   ttt Rqq  . Calculating the present value of a piece 
of land sold in period T  yields 
(27) 


T
t T
t
T
T
RRRRRR
q
q
2 3232
1
......

 for  ,2,1,0t  
The first term equals the present value of the price at which the land is eventually sold, and 
the second term amounts to the present value of all future land rents up to period 2T  . It is 
assumed that there is a strictly positive land income share tt YL /  that satisfies 
0/   tt YL .  
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Rearranging this yields 
(28) ,
L
Yt
t

               .2t  
After inserting (20) into the above equation, plugging it into (27) and dropping the first term 
of that equation, one obtains a lower estimate of 1q :  
(29) 


T
t t
t
RRR
LGGGY
q
2 32
321
1 .
...
... 
 
Rearranging to solve for the land share in total output and setting T  shows 
(30) 



2 32
32
1
1 .
...
...
t t
t
RRR
GGG
Y
Lq
  
As the total land share cannot exceed output, the right-hand side of the equation must be less 
than or equal to one. Thus, the sum cannot reach infinite values, implying that its elements 
must converge to zero. This is in accordance with the efficiency condition derived in (22). A 
proof paralleling the stationary state example given earlier but including land can also be 
found in Homburg (2014), showing that even as the time preference rate   approaches zero, 
rising land values will keep the interest factor R  above one. This is due to the fact that intro-
ducing land into the model enables households to trade in an additional market, serving as an 
alternative savings vehicle. The result is a market mechanism that automatically prevents the 
interest rate from falling below the growth rate in the limit.   
Homburg (2014, pp. 10) then goes on to show that land is empirically relevant, pointing out 
that land values exceed GDP and public debt in all of the countries he considers, and even 
coming close to the value of reproducible capital in most countries. Hence, it would be a capi-
tal mistake to ignore land in the assessment of an economy. For the evaluation of dynamic 
efficiency, this has strong implications, because it means that overaccumulation is an issue of 
purely theoretical nature and never a state that could actually be realized. This also rules out 
the possibility of Ponzi schemes and with that the feasibility of public debt.  
There are of course objections to Homburg’s (1991, 1992, 2014) theory. Homburg (1992, p. 
51) himself mentions that his theory could fail in the absence of perfect competition. On the 
other hand, this is a standard assumption in economic models and dropping it would invali-
date several theories commonly drawn upon. Hence, it is not a flaw inherent to Homburg’s 
theory but rather a limitation most theories are subjected to.  
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Von Weizsäcker (2014, pp. 48) argues that land values will not go beyond any limit to offset 
the fall in interest rates due to insecure property rights. He mentions expropriation and taxa-
tion as of the main sources that are especially effective because land, as opposed to other pos-
sessions, cannot be moved abroad. Therefore, the price of land includes a risk premium that 
keeps it from reaching infinitely high values. Kim and Lee (1997) also argue that taxation 
could still lead to inefficiency in an economy with land. Homburg (2014, 2014:2) evaluates 
these claims and proves that these allegations are incorrect, as long as the land rent is not 
completely taxed away. A tax that affects capital and land to the same degree will not change 
the arbitrage condition (26). Even a tax on rent or land values leaves the results unchanged, as 
long as the after-tax rent is still positive. Additionally, as can be seen in Homburg (1992, pp. 
40), the term “land” is representative for all commodities that don’t need to be produced, can-
not be reproduced, and are not used up. For example, the criteria also apply to works of art16, 
which are not subject to the immobility of actual land.   
As for expropriation, Homburg (2014) also points out that historically, the risk of expropria-
tion rose with increased government spending. This implies that motivating further debt with 
the invalidity of the land theorem due to expropriation risks constitutes a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. Additionally, the recent experience in Greece shows that government bonds are just as 
prone – if not more – to expropriation, preserving the validity of the land theorem.    
 
  
                                                          
16 Homburg (1992, p. 42) gives the example of a picture by Rembrandt.  
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Chapter 2: Applying the Theory – Methods of Assessing Dynamic  
Efficiency 
In order to derive policy implications from the theories described in the last chapter, a closer 
look at real economies is necessary. Many authors have tried assessing dynamic (in)efficiency 
for different countries. This chapter will examine four empirical studies conducted in the past 
decades that used different measures to evaluate the state of several economies. It will then be 
shown that some of these approaches are not appropriate due to needing strong assumptions 
and yielding contradictory results. This applies to the measures that do not rely on a compari-
son of interest and growth rates as presented in Chapter 1.3.. However, if the interest and 
growth rate comparison is chosen to assess dynamic (in)efficiency, the decision which interest 
rate to use is crucial for the results of the analysis. Therefore, different interest rates that have 
been used in past analyses or that have been mentioned in public discussions on the topic will 
be considered. It will become clear that none of these seem to suffice for an accurate assess-
ment of overaccumulation. Therefore, a new interest rate that has not yet been considered in 
this context will be presented.   
2.1.  Review of Important Empirical Studies So Far 
 
Abel et al. (1989) published a paper that has been very influential on the topic of assessing 
dynamic efficiency up to this day. Prior to their publication, an approach based on the theoret-
ical work by Phelps (1961), Diamond (1965) and others as described in the first chapter has 
been used to judge dynamic efficiency for economies. However, instead of looking at growth 
and interest rates and how they relate to each other, they develop a new criterion. Arguing that 
the marginal productivity of capital is not observable, they propose a test based on the rela-
tionship between investment and return on capital which can be calculated using observable 
figures. This criterion is derived from a generalization of the Diamond (1965) model that ac-
counts for stochastic population growth and production technology, while the production 
technology is kept very general and considers changes in the relative prices. Abel et al. (1989) 
define a net dividend that is equal to profit less investment of the market portfolio. If that div-
idend divided by the ex-dividend value of said portfolio is positive at all times in all states of 
nature, then the economy is dynamically efficient.  
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Conversely, if the fraction is negative at all times in all states of nature, the economy is ineffi-
cient, a proposition that they prove following the line of argument Cass (1972) used. The cri-
terion thus requires strong assumptions to yield a definitive result.  
Abel et al. (1989) also extend their criterion to an alternative measurement through interest 
and growth rates to relate it to the standard concept. They argue that the safe interest rate on 
government bonds is not suitable to evaluate dynamic efficiency when compared with the 
growth rate. Instead, they propose to use the rate of return on the market portfolio and com-
pare it to the growth rate of the market portfolio. In that case the economy can be said to be 
dynamically efficient if the interest rate always exceeds the growth rate and inefficient if it 
always falls short. Alternatively, one could indeed use the easily-determined safe interest rate, 
but then it is necessary to compare it to the growth rate of the market value of the capital 
stock, which strongly fluctuates due to capital gains and losses and would as a criterion most 
likely remain inconclusive. This way of assessing dynamic efficiency is therefore not practical 
for assessing actual economies, which is why they use the net dividend criterion in their as-
sessment.  
They derive the measure for gross capital income – the profit – by taking the national income, 
adding capital consumption allowances and then subtracting employee compensation and an 
estimate of the labor income of proprietors.  
They are thus left with a residual that measures profit, rental, and interest income. Gross in-
vestment corresponds to residential and nonresidential capital and includes increases in inven-
tories. Subtracting investment from profit then yields the dividend, which has to be divided by 
the market value of outstanding equity plus net financial liabilities. They use data from the 
National Balance Sheets and the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) for the USA 
and OECD data for the other countries they evaluate.  
Using this criterion, they assess dynamic efficiency for the USA (1953-1985), England, 
France, Germany, Italy, Canada, and Japan (1960-1984) and find that all these countries fulfill 
the criterion during the time observed. However, they note like Phelps (1961) that no certain 
assessment is achievable unless one takes the whole growth path of an economy into consid-
eration, which would include all future paths as well as the past. Since it is not possible to 
know whether the dividend criterion will be satisfied in the future, their result only implies 
dynamic efficiency if it is assumed that the economies have always behaved the way they did 
during the observed period and will continue to behave that way forever.  
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Geerolf (2013) revisits the theory of Abel et al. (1989) and, using updated data and more 
countries, reevaluates their results. He extends the analysis to include Australia, Belgium, 
Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Russia, South Korea, Sweden, and Switzerland. He uses updat-
ed data on National Accounts provided by the OECD, which also includes mixed income that 
the NIPA neglect. In addition, he also uses country specific land data taken from the OECD 
database and Goldsmith (1985) to subtract land income from the dividend. Abel et al. (1989) 
falsely include land in their estimate due to a lack of reliable data, but state that adjusting their 
estimates for a rental income on land of up to 10% would not overturn their results. Geerolf 
(2013), having this data at his disposal, is thus able to establish an updated version of the div-
idend criterion. Evaluating the different countries, he finds that – contrary to Abel et al.’s 
(1989) assessment – none of the countries under consideration can be declared to work effi-
ciently. He even finds evidence that suggests that Japan and South Korea are overaccumulat-
ing capital.  
Barbie et al. (2004) also review the paper published by Abel et al. (1989) and critically evalu-
ate the net dividend criterion. They argue that the criterion developed by Abel et al. (1989) is 
in fact a criterion to determine interim pareto optimality.17 This does not conflict with the re-
sults and implications of Abel et al. (1989) per se – if an economy is pareto optimal, it is also 
dynamically efficient. Conversely, a dynamically efficient economy can still be pareto subop-
timal18. As a result, assessing pareto optimality requires far stronger assumptions than as-
sessing dynamic efficiency, and applying a criterion meant for the former to evaluate the latter 
can lead to wrong conclusions. They develop a criterion based on Zilcha (1991) that goes 
back to the idea of comparing growth rates and interest rates and indicates dynamic efficiency 
if on average the interest rate exceeds the growth rate. This criterion is then applied to the 
USA using data from 1890-1999. The interest rate corresponds to the capital rental rate de-
rived by Mulligan (2002)19, which is calculated dividing capital income by capital. The 
growth rate is calculated using data obtained from Romer (1989) for 1890-1928 and from 
NIPA for 1929-1999.  
                                                          
17 Abel et al. (1989, p. 15) also indicate in their paper that their “criterion is the dynamic analogue of the standard Pareto criterion”, though as 
 Barbie et al. (2004) point out, this has been overlooked by some of the literature.  
18 Under certainty, the two concepts of dynamic efficiency and pareto optimality coincide. Allowing for uncertainty opens up a new source of 
inefficiency in OLG models that stems from incomplete risk-sharing. In this case, sophisticated Ponzi schemes can be feasible if the interest 
rate on government debt is below the growth rate even though the economy is not overaccumulating capital. For more on this, see Barbie et 
al. (2001, 2004), Blanchard and Weil (2001), or Ball et al. (1998). For the remainder of the thesis, the focus will be on the classical Ponzi 
schemes that are ruled out by dynamic efficiency in the sense that the economy can lower savings now without having to depress future 
consumption. Rejecting the feasibility of sophisticated Ponzi schemes requires more assumptions that lie beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Additionally, if land is introduced into the model, inefficiency due to incomplete risk-sharing is rendered impossible, as Richter (1993) has 
shown.    
19 More on this later under Chapter 2.2..  
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They find that the US economy is dynamically efficient, but that the interest rate did fall short 
of the growth rate at times. They point out how this would conflict with the net dividend crite-
rion by Abel et al. (1989). Using the interest rate extension by Abel et al. (1989) to their crite-
rion, Barbie et al.’s (2004) results would remain inconclusive with respect to the assessment 
of dynamic efficiency, since it would need the interest rate to either always exceed the growth 
rate (for efficiency) or always fall short (for inefficiency). Therefore, Abel et al. (1989) would 
not indicate dynamic efficiency with these interest rates, whereas the criterion by Barbie et al. 
(2004) clearly does. The difference is that Barbie et al. (2004) only assess dynamic efficiency, 
not pareto optimality. Since the criterion by Abel et al. (1989) indicated interim pareto opti-
mality, but using interest rates according to their approach would remain inconclusive, some-
thing is clearly at odds with respect to the results.  
Yet another very recent assessment is presented by Homburg (2014). After evaluating the 
possibility of overaccumulation in the presence of land (see Chapter 1.5.), he turns to evaluat-
ing dynamic efficiency for the US economy and the eurozone. Just like Barbie et al. (2004), 
he makes use of the comparison of interest and growth rates. The derivation of his criterion 
has already been presented in Chapter 1.3..  
His approach suggests that the relevant interest rate for the assessment of dynamic efficiency 
has to reflect the uncertainty faced by firms when choosing their investment strategy. As firms 
use a mix of debt and equity for financing investment – and equity financing is generally as-
sumed to yield a higher return – the cost of debt financing corresponds to a lower estimate of 
the cost of capital actually faced by firms. Therefore, if this rate can already be shown to en-
sure dynamic efficiency, then so will other measures reflecting the cost of capital more close-
ly. Homburg (2014) uses Moody’s Aaa bond yields for the US (1985–2013) and interest rate 
data provided by the ECB for the eurozone (2003–2013) and compares them to the growth 
rate of the economies. His results show that while in both cases the interest rate is not above 
the growth rate at all times, it is still greater on average by a visible margin and thus indicates 
dynamic efficiency. He also mentions considering Japan and other countries without finding 
evidence of dynamic inefficiency anywhere, though he does not present these results.  
Some of the results by these authors seem to contradict each other, which poses the question 
of the reliability of these different measures. This becomes especially clear in the case of the 
net dividend criterion developed by Abel et al. (1989), which was not only shown to yield 
different conclusions when using more appropriate data but also argued to be unsuitable to 
test for dynamic efficiency due to necessarily strong assumptions.  
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The causes of these claims will now be examined closer to see whether the net dividend crite-
rion could still be used to reliably determine the efficiency of an economy.  
The assessment conducted by Abel et al. (1989) is biased in several aspects, which was one of 
the main reasons for Geerolf (2013) to update their data. First, as previously stated, they in-
clude land in their criterion, which as a non-reproducible asset is not capital in the sense that 
the dynamic efficiency theory is concerned with. Rental income should therefore not be in-
cluded in the analysis.20 Abel et al. (1989) acknowledge this shortcoming, but due to a lack of 
specific data on land they include it, leading their criterion to be possibly overoptimistic of 
efficiency. Nevertheless, they state that accounting for a rental income share of 5%, an esti-
mate originally proposed by Rhee (1988), their results do not change and remain the same 
even if a higher rental rate (up to 10%) is assumed. Another potential falsification of the data 
is possible if the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns are violated, leading 
to an inclusion of e.g. monopoly rents in the investment returns and thus again pushing up the 
dividend.  
Abel et al. (1989) are also aware of this complication, even so they believe this effect to not 
be significant and refer to the observation that Tobin’s q  for the USA equals one on average 
over the past five decades.21 A further weak point in the calculation is the estimate of the la-
bor income of proprietors. As Geerolf (2013) states, the NIPA only account for mixed income 
of proprietors, but not of unincorporated enterprises, and therefore exclude a portion of mixed 
income earned in the economy. Furthermore, there is the question of how much of the mixed 
income should be attributed to capital and how much to labor. Abel et al. (1989) impute 1/3 of 
mixed income to capital, which corresponds to the value traditionally used.22 Still, choosing a 
slightly different value can have drastic effects on the outcome.  
Calculating the profit as a residual size from National Accounts is at the heart of these prob-
lems. It leads the dividend to include not only estimates for monopoly rents and land rents, 
but also services of owner-occupied housing, as Homburg (2014, p. 16) points out. These 
items are important for measuring the GDP and are therefore included in those numbers. 
However, they are not capital as is understood in the context of dynamic efficiency. They 
would hence have to be disentangled from the GDP, and even then it is not clear whether all 
that remains is truly only capital.  
                                                          
20 This also applies to income from other non-reproducible assets such as natural resources (Geerolf, 2013). However, determining their 
value is equally or in some cases even more difficult.  
21 Tobin’s q represents the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of capital, see Tobin (1969, p.21).  
22 Christensen (1971) discusses and derives this value that is commonly used ever since (Geerolf (2013)).  
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Bos (2007, 2013) investigates the limitations of using National Accounts in economic analy-
sis. He argues that the derivation of National Accounts is at times detached from economic 
theory because it relies heavily on administrative concepts. In addition, the computation of the 
National Accounts varies with respect to scope, detail, quality, and frequency between coun-
tries despite international standards due to missing data and differing amounts of resources 
that are put into the computation of National Accounts as well as the need for approximation 
of certain variables. National Accounts are calculated from many heterogeneous data sources, 
and changing international and national standards affect the continuity and consistency of 
National Accounts over time, which might bias time series over a longer horizon. This greatly 
affects the reliability of the measures calculated from this data.  
From a purely theoretical viewpoint, Barbie et al. (2001) point out that the net dividend crite-
rion is really a criterion for pareto optimality and the sufficient conditions that have to be ful-
filled are a lot more constricting than they need to be, as was already mentioned. In addition 
to this, Chattopadhyay (2008) identifies a mathematical flaw in Abel et al.’s (1989) proof and 
shows that even when the net dividend criterion is fulfilled, an economy that is not pareto 
optimal can be constructed.   
As Geerolf (2013) uses the same criterion, most of the critique above also applies to his as-
sessment. The net dividend criterion is thus not an optimal strategy when assessing dynamic 
efficiency. A criterion of the Zilcha (1990, 1991)/Homburg (2014) type eliminates the prob-
lem of using a residual size and furthermore has the bonus of being a lot less demanding. 
However, as will be seen later, if National Accounts are used to calculate the interest rate 
needed, the issues with applying such measures resurface. Nonetheless, comparing growth 
and interest rates is a more attractive evaluation method due to weaker assumptions. It is also 
the main line of argument brought up in public discussions by economists when talking about 
efficiency and debt recommendations, as will be shown in the next section. A comparison of 
interest and growth rates is therefore the dynamic efficiency evaluation technique used in this 
thesis.  
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2.2.  Determining “The” Interest Rate 
 
Now that the method of evaluation has been established, the derivation of the two rates has to 
be clarified. The growth rate poses a rather simple case as it will be calculated from nominal 
GDP data from the countries under consideration which is generally easy to obtain.  
In contrast, the interest rate is a different issue, as the marginal rate of productivity is not ob-
servable and needs to be approximated using other figures. In the past, several interest rates 
have been used by different authors or in public debates to talk about the issue of dynamic 
efficiency. These shall now be presented.  
To start off, a look at the current debate will be conducted. There has been some talk about 
the real interest rate being negative, an argument brought forward by von Weizsäcker (2014) 
in a recent article and Lawrence Summers (2013, 2014) at talks before the International Mon-
etary Fund23 (IMF) and the American Economic Association24 (AEA). The conclusion that 
both draw from this assessment is that government debt should be welcomed.  
The former argues that in a world without public debt, the real interest rate consistent with full 
employment has become negative, and the only way to ensure price stability under prosperity 
is to engage in government spending. He claims that the government is indeed the only agent 
in such an economy that could credibly run a Ponzi scheme (Von Weizsäcker, 2014, p. 50). 
As has already been shown in Chapter 1.4., Ponzi schemes in the form that the government 
can roll over a debt indefinitely, leading it to vanish in the limit, are only feasible in a dynam-
ically inefficient economy with gr  . His position that the market risk-free real rate of inter-
est is below the growth rate thus leads him to suggest that the prevailing negative view of 
public debt is unjustified. Summers (2014) is even clearer in his statement, arguing that in a 
time when gr  , fiscal consolidation is not only the wrong strategy, but that the “central 
imperative is anti-austerity, not austerity, and it has the potential to be as free a lunch as eco-
nomics will ever find” (2014, 1:23:10 h). He proposes “direct fiscal policy actions” (2014, 
1:17:45 h) to take advantage of the current situation and eventually induce increased invest-
ment and lower saving, reversing the trend and escaping what he calls the “modern secular 
stagnation” (2014, 1:03:30 h). While he repeatedly declares that his claim of a negative real 
interest rate is only a suggestion and not a fact, he also stresses that his theory would go far in 
explaining the experience of the United States after 2007.  
                                                          
23 Summers (2013).  
24 Summers (2014). 
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In addition, he paints a rather dark picture of future economic development, including either 
inadequate or unsustainable growth as well as high unemployment, if the right measures are 
not taken up.  
The situation described by von Weizsäcker (2014) and Summers (2014) is essentially a sav-
ings glut. This term was coined by Ben Bernanke (2005) and describes an excess of savings 
over investment. At the time, he argued that an increase in savings, primarily in emerging and 
developing countries, was met by insufficient investment opportunities in these countries, 
causing them to lend money abroad. As a result, the United States were confronted with a 
particularly high capital flow from other countries, which pushed down real interest rates and 
increased the current account deficit. However, the validity of his claim was challenged by 
several authors, including Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010), who show that the global savings 
rate did not rise during the relevant period and offer an alternative explanation based on asset 
bubbles. Nevertheless, the logic behind Bernanke’s (2005) claim may still hold. Summers 
(2014) argues that a reduction in population and possibly even technological growth has re-
duced the demand for investment. At the same time, people tend to save more, which is the 
same line of argument that von Weizsäcker (2014) uses to establish his claim of an excess 
supply of savings over investment opportunities. If this were indeed true, low real interest 
rates are an indicator of a savings glut that would in turn favor the view of von Weizsäcker 
(2014) and Summers (2013, 2014) about a negative real interest rate. 
Both of these lines of argumentation are based on describing possible symptoms or circum-
stances that would suggest that the real rate of interest is negative. The rate which they are 
referring to is a risk-free interest rate that cannot be measured properly, making it impossible 
to back up their claim. Their argument thus remains on the theoretical level. However, there is 
an observable interest rate that is usually described as being “safe” – the interest rate on gov-
ernment bonds. The nominal interest rate on 30-year treasury bills in the US is currently 
above 3%25, which is far from zero, and even accounting for inflation, the real rate stays posi-
tive. Admittedly, as Abel et al. (1989) point out, the short-term rate has historically been be-
low the growth rate for many countries, as several authors have shown26, and is currently also 
close to zero. This is in accordance with Summers’ (2014) consideration that the short-term 
interest rate consistent with full employment is negative.  
                                                          
25 Source: Federal Reserve H15, September 2014.  
26 They cite Ibbotson (1987) and Mishkin (1984).  
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On the other hand, Abel et al. (1989) also explicitly state that this safe interest rate is not the 
relevant rate when assessing dynamic efficiency in a stochastic economy.  
It is important to recall that in the theoretical model by Diamond (1965), the interest rate is 
equal to the marginal product of capital. In a non-stochastic model, this results in all interest 
rates being equal, and the safe rate on government bonds is the same as the marginal product 
on capital. In a stochastic environment this equality vanishes and multiple interest rates 
emerge. This argument is not only brought forward by Abel et al. (1989), but also repeated by 
Bohn (1995), Blanchard and Weil (2001) and others. They show that dynamic efficiency can 
still hold while the safe interest rate is below the growth rate. Bohn (1995) derives a stochastic 
model of an economy with a safe and a risky interest rate to examine the sustainability of 
budget deficits. He finds that the safe interest rate has no impact on the path of debt (Bohn, 
1995, p. 266) and is thus irrelevant for the assessment of debt sustainability. Homburg (2014) 
develops a simulation of a stochastic stationary economy that starts out with a negative safe 
interest rate and a positive risky interest rate and zero public debt. Since the interest rate on 
government bonds is negative, a first glance might suggest that a Ponzi scheme is possible.  
Contrary to this proposal, after introducing an initial debt and maintaining a primary balance 
in every period after that, the simulation shows that the safe interest rate will in time be re-
peatedly positive and the debt level will skyrocket with probability one. A successful Ponzi 
scheme is impossible. Homburg (2014) points out that this is due to the debt causing a decline 
in the capital stock, which is in turn associated with an output loss. The output loss depends 
on the risky rate, not the safe rate, and leads to a further capital stock reduction. The resulting 
vicious circle eventually leads to a collapse of the economy. This simulation emphasizes the 
importance of considering risky rates when it comes to assessing dynamic efficiency. The safe 
rate on government bonds is therefore not suitable for this undertaking.  
Another argument brought forward by Summers (2014) should be investigated further as well. 
He argues that if the zero lower bound (ZLB) is a constraint, fiscal policy should be expand-
ed. Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) have also claimed that nominal interest rates have 
reached this lower bound and come to the conclusion that government spending is necessary.  
The concept of the zero lower bound is that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero. This 
development has taken up substantial interest in the ability of central banks to influence the 
economy. In times of high interest rates and sluggish growth, the interest rate is usually low-
ered to induce investment and thus stimulate the economy. If the interest rate is already close 
to zero, a further reduction to the extent needed is not possible.  
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This primarily relates to the interest rates that can be influenced by the central banks and is 
most likely the reason why the zero lower bound is mentioned by these economists. In the 
past years, the interest rate relevant for banks borrowing from the central bank in the United 
States – the Federal Funds Rate – has been close to zero. The ECB main refinancing opera-
tions rate (MRO) – the European equivalent to the Federal Funds Rate – has reached its low-
est levels so far. The Federal Funds Rate has been below 1% since the end of 2008 and is cur-
rently at 0,09%27. On September 10th 2014, the ECB lowered the MRO to 0,05%28. With in-
terest rates so low, the issue of the zero lower bound arises.  
However, while it is true that short-term rates such as the overnight Federal Funds Rate have 
been close to zero for the past years, this does not hold for long-term rates. This can be seen in 
Figure 2 that compares different interest rates for the eurozone and the USA. While there is a 
visible downward trend in all interest rates, only the short-term interbank rates are anywhere 
near zero.  
All other rates are still well above the zero lower bound. Contrary to Summers’ (2014) rea-
soning, the short-term rates are not relevant for investment decisions, but rather the long-term 
interest rates.29 Moreover, the Federal Funds Rate and the MRO are rates only accessible to 
banks, not firms or individuals, which are the relevant investors in macroeconomic models. 
The interest rates relevant for these agents are around 4% in the USA and around 3% in the 
eurozone. Therefore, as Homburg (2013) points out, the zero lower bound debate is ill-placed 
when intertemporal budget constraints are concerned, because it focuses on the wrong interest 
rates. Hence, the key interest rates such as the interbank rate of an economy are also not ap-
plicable when assessing dynamic efficiency.  
                                                          
27 Source: Federal Board of Governors Database. Effective August 2014.  
28 Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.  Effective September 2014.  
29 At the talk before the American Economic Association, Sinn (2014) proposes another counterargument for using short-term rates: Low 
interest rates have been observed in Japan over the past 20 years. Yet, fiscal policy has not been able to improve the situation.  
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Sources:  
USA: Federal Board of Governors Database –  
H15/H15/RIFSPFF_N.M; H15/H15/RIFLGFCY10_N.M; H15/H15/RMMPCCFC_N.M; H15/H15/RIMLPAAAR_N.M; 
Eurozone: Eurostat – Time Series irt_lt_mcby_m;  
ECB Statistical Data Warehouse – 
FM.B.U2.EUR.4F.KR.MRR_FR.LEV; FM.B.U2.EUR.4F.KR.MRR_MBR.LEV; MIR.M.U2.B.A2C.A.C.A.2250.EUR.N; 
MIR.M.U2.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O;  
Accessed: September 2014.  
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As has been pointed out above, the relevant interest rate has to reflect the marginal productivi-
ty of capital. None of the main interest rates typically used as indicators in public debates – 
the interbank rates or yields on government bonds – suffice in approximating this figure. Sev-
eral authors have therefore deduced own calculations of the return on capital and based their 
judgment on these estimates.  
Motivated by a discussion about a possibly falling rate of profit, Feldstein and Summers 
(1977) develop a measure for the rate of return on capital from national account data to inves-
tigate this proposition. They calculate two pre-tax rates, a net rate of return and a gross rate of 
return and define the rate of return as profits of nonfinancial corporations plus total interest 
paid by them and divide this by the sum of the value of the fixed capital stock, the value of 
inventories, and the value of land, all at the end of the year. For the net rate, they use net op-
erating profits, net interest rates and the net fixed capital stock, while for the gross rate of re-
turn they use the corresponding gross value of these measures. Increases in the value of inven-
tories and capital gains resulting from price changes in capital or land relative to consumption 
goods are excluded from operating profits. The stock of fixed capital is determined by revalu-
ing the previous fixed capital stock and adding investment. For the net rate, “economic depre-
ciation” (Feldstein and Summers, 1977, p. 214) is subtracted, while for the gross rate an esti-
mate of “scrapped” (Feldstein and Summers, 1977, p. 215) capital goods is deducted. They 
calculate the interest rates for the US from 1948-1976 and find that during that period, the net 
and gross rates of return have exceeded 10% in most periods. However, during the period 
from 1970-1976, these interest rates have dropped to an average of 7.9% (net) and 9.6% 
(gross). They note that while there is no clear downward trend in the interest rates over the 
entire period observed, there is a substantial drop in the 1970s. Nevertheless, they do believe 
that this is a temporary development. Feldstein (1977) later uses this data to support his claim 
that the United States saves too little. A higher saving only induces a higher consumption in 
the future if the economy is in a dynamically efficient state, as can easily be seen from Figure 
1 in Chapter 1.1.. In arguing that the US would profit from higher savings, Feldstein (1977) 
assumes that the economy is dynamically efficient, and he bases this judgment on a compari-
son of the growth rate with the rate of return calculated in collaboration with Summers earlier.  
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As already mentioned above, Barbie et al. (2004) also use an interest rate for their assessment 
of the US economy. They draw on results by Mulligan (2002), who argued that “the interest 
rate” relevant for macroeconomic models cannot be deduced from an observed rate of a single 
asset, such as Treasury bill yields. Instead, he also draws on national account data to derive a 
measure of capital income that he then divides by capital at current cost to obtain the return on 
the capital stock. The capital income30 CapInc  is calculated as follows:  
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where  
 Y    = real net domestic product 
 gY   = real net product of the government sector 
 pW    = private employee compensation of domestic residents 
 NI   = national income 
 gW   = labor compensation of domestic government employees 
 sY   = proprietors’ income 
 
It is immediately visible that this calculation differs from the calculation by Feldstein and 
Summers (1977). His results also differ, and the rental rate on capital31 is between 3.7-12.5% 
from 1900-1999.  
 
A third calculation of the interest rate that is meant to yield a proxy for the return on capital 
and that has recently attracted a lot of attention is the interest rate derived by Piketty (2014). 
Piketty’s book “Capital in the twenty-first century” establishes the claim that gr   through-
out most of history until the 19th century and most likely again during the 21st century (Piket-
ty, 2014, p. 26). His calculation of r  is – similar to the approaches above – a division of capi-
tal income by the national stock of capital (Piketty, 2014, pp. 201) based on National Account 
data. Capital income is the sum of rents, profits, dividends, interest, royalties, and other forms 
of annual income except for labor income. This income is pre-taxation and excludes interest 
on public debt. He provides graphs of these rates for Britain and France from 1770-2010 and 
1820-1919, respectively (Piketty, 2014, p. 202), and explains that the rate is already a real rate 
(Piketty, 2014, pp. 209) due to the fact that the capital income mainly comes from “real as-
sets”.  
                                                          
30 A more precise description would be the “real income to domestically employed private capital“, see Mulligan (2002, p. 40).  
31 This measure is pre-direct taxes. For a further discussion on the effect of taxes, see Mulligan (2002).  
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However, he argues that this rate overestimates what he calls the “pure rate of return on capi-
tal” (Piketty, 2014, p. 205) due to the negligence of informal financial intermediation – the 
time used to manage a private portfolio – which can be compared to entrepreneurial labor. 
This would thus have to be deducted from the rate of return to yield the pure rate of return. 
Using an estimate of the cost associated with portfolio management, he finds that the pure rate 
of return on capital in Britain and France in the long run has stayed relatively constant around 
4-5%, while estimates for the early 21st century are a little lower at 3-4%.  
These three approaches all differ and consequently all yield diverse results even though simi-
lar data is used. It is difficult to say which of these rates is closest to the actual marginal 
productivity of capital. All rates include land rents, which as has already been pointed out is 
not a part of reproducible capital and should thus not be considered. Homburg (2014:3) 
strongly criticizes Piketty’s approach of equating capital with wealth throughout his book, 
especially since separate data on land and capital becomes more and more accessible due to 
the introduction of the SNA32 (2008). This criticism can naturally not be directed towards 
Feldstein and Summers (1977) or Mulligan (2002), who did not have access to this kind of 
data. Nonetheless, the fact that they deliberately include figures such as land, land rents, or 
imputed services of owner-occupied dwellings33, when, according to Homburg (2014, p. 16), 
they are “not capital income in the theoretical sense”, strongly suggests that the measures are 
quite biased. This is once more the inherent problem of calculating a rate of return based on a 
residual size using National Accounts that has already been described in connection with the 
net dividend criterion by Abel et al. (1989).  
Therefore, the notion of trying to derive an interest rate that is not directly observable through 
such calculations will be dismissed for the analysis conducted in this thesis. Instead, a differ-
ent approach is chosen, which is based on an idea introduced by Homburg (2014), who uses 
interest rates on corporate bonds for his test.  
Taking a step back and revisiting the original Diamond (1965) model, the relevant interest 
rate corresponds to the marginal productivity of capital. As can be seen in Chapter 1.2., firms 
maximize their profit by choosing an investment strategy that uses the marginal productivity 
of capital as a benchmark for investment.  
                                                          
32 System of National Accounts.  
33 Mulligan (2002, p. 10) explicitly states that he includes owner-occupied housing in his data on capital.  
 34 
 
Applying this to real economies, a good measure for “the interest rate” should then be the rate 
that firms base their investment decisions on.34 If firms only finance their investment using 
equity, the rate of return on equity would then correspond to the relevant interest rate. If, on 
the other hand, firms only use debt financing, the interest they pay on this debt drives invest-
ment decisions. In reality, firms usually choose a mix between these two types of financing. 
According to Berk and DeMarzo (2010, p. 266), debt financing is less risky than equity fi-
nancing and its cost is therefore less than the cost of equity. Additionally, it is cheaper be-
cause the interest paid on debt is usually deductible from the tax base, while the cost of equity 
financing is not, favoring debt financing. At the same time, increasing the leverage will drive 
up the risk of the equity (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011, p. 464) due to additional financial dis-
tress, as pointed out by Brealey et al. (2014, p. 455). Firms thus need to find a balance be-
tween these two forces to reduce their cost of capital. The result is a firm-specific cost of capi-
tal that any investment has to earn as a minimum in order to be undertaken. An instrument to 
determine this threshold exists in the form of weighted average cost of capital (WACC).  
Until now, the WACC have not been considered by other authors in the context of assessing 
dynamic (in)efficiency, as they are an instrument used by firms and not available on an ag-
gregate national level. However, they represent the cost associated with investment better than 
any of the other interest rates presented in this chapter. Therefore, the WACC will be used in 
the analysis of this thesis to determine whether or not selected economies grow dynamically 
efficient. The only drawback to using WACC data is that national estimates are hard to obtain. 
More on this will be presented in the analysis section of this thesis in Chapter 3.1.2.. The 
basic concept and computation of the WACC for firms will be explained in the following sec-
tion.  
2.3.  Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 
The WACC are, as pointed out by Hostettler (2000, S. 168), a standard measure for firms 
when assessing whether or not an investment should be undertaken. The WACC are calculat-
ed as an average of the interest rate paid on equity and the after-tax interest rate paid on debt, 
weighted according to the share of equity and debt, respectively.  
                                                          
34 It should be noted at this point that the interest rate only corresponds to the marginal productivity of capital under the assumption of perfect 
competition. This might not be given in the real world. However, it is a standard assumption in macroeconomic analyses also adopted for the 
other approaches and dropping it would make any attempt of calculating the relevant interest rate more or less unattainable.  
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The WACC waccr  are determined using the following calculation
35: 
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where 
 E    = market value of equity 
 D   = market value of debt (net of cash) 
 Er   = equity cost of capital 
 Dr   = debt cost of capital 
 c   = marginal corporate tax rate 
 
While the values for E , D , Dr , and c  can usually be taken directly from a firm’s financial 
statement, the equity cost of capital has to be calculated because it is not observable, as Weber 
et al. (2004, p. 52) state. The most common derivation of the equity cost of capital is through 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which was first introduced by Sharpe (1964). Ac-
cording to Bruner et al. (1998, pp. 15) it is used by 81% of US firms and 8 out of 10 invest-
ment consulting firms. Applying the CAPM, the equity cost of capital can be calculated 
from36: 
(33)   fMktfE rRErr  *  
where 
  fr   = risk-free rate 
     = beta of the firm 
  MktRE  = expected return on the market portfolio 
 
 
The term   fMkt rRE   corresponds to the market risk premium and reflects the premium 
that investors earn due to the market risk of holding the market portfolio.   represents the 
risk associated with the firm i  under consideration. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 See Berk and DeMarzo (2011), p. 596.  
36 See Berk and DeMarzo (2011), pp. 359. 
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It is defined as  
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and can only be calculated ex-post using time series on the return of the market portfolio and 
the firm in question. For a more detailed explanation on how   can be calculated, see Berk 
and DeMarzo (2011, pp. 383).  
By accurately weighing the cost of different sources of capital, the WACC are used by firms 
when deciding whether or not to pursue a project. It is the driving factor behind investment 
decisions, and much more relevant for managers than macroeconomic measures calculated 
from National Accounts. The WACC can therefore be seen as a good approximation of the 
marginal productivity of capital. As this sort of data is only available at a firm-level, a nation-
al average will be derived using large numbers of firms within each country. A more detailed 
description on this computation will be provided in Chapter 3.1.2..   
2.4.  Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the derivation of a method to assess dynamic efficiency for real econ-
omies. Methods by other authors and their limitations were considered and the net dividend 
criterion by Abel et al. (1989) was declared as insufficient for the purpose of this thesis, in 
spite of its popularity in the dynamic efficiency literature. Instead, the analysis will draw its 
results from comparing interest and growth rates. Next, different interest rates were examined 
that have been or could potentially be used. One important insight taken from this analysis is 
that the public debate often falsely concentrates on “safe” rates of return on government 
bonds or interbank rates such as the Federal Funds Rate. Economists join in and justify push-
ing for fiscal expansion and debt policy because these rates are below the growth rate of the 
economy. However, they focus on the wrong rate, which could potentially be very dangerous 
if their policy proposals are followed. If their assessment is wrong and the economy is indeed 
efficient, public debt is not a sustainable policy. The relevant rate for the assessment of dy-
namic efficiency is one that determines investment decisions in an economy. For firms, this is 
commonly measured by calculating the WACC. For that reason, the following analysis will 
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use WACC data to determine an average interest rate for all OECD countries as well as China 
and compare this rate with the growth rate of the economies.   
Chapter 3:  An Empirical Test of Dynamic            
Efficiency 
 
 “It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data. Insensibly one begins to twist facts to 
suit theories, instead of theories to suit facts.”  
― Arthur Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes: A Scandal in Bohemia (1891) 
As was pointed out previously, the overaccumulation debate has gained new interest in the 
past couple years. Many economists like von Weizsäcker (2014) or Summers (2013, 2014) 
fear that the developed countries have reached a state in which the interest rate has fallen be-
low the growth rate. In this case, Ponzi games become feasible (see Chapter 1.4.), and gov-
ernment debt is a popular remedy meant to make the economy better off.  
The debate is held at a mostly theoretical level without a deeper look at the data available, as 
can be seen for example when watching the talks at the IMF or the AEA that were already 
discussed in Chapter 2.2.. Some authors try to develop new methods like the dividend criteri-
on by Abel et al. (1989) that was later extended upon by Geerolf (2013). Trying to provide a 
better picture on overaccumulation, some of these papers’ results nonetheless remain incon-
clusive about the state of the economy in question.  
What most of these analyses fail to incorporate in their empirical assessment is that the ques-
tion of dynamic efficiency – and with that, the feasibility of public debt schemes – eventually 
boils down to the relationship of interest and growth rates. Whereas growth rates are easy to 
obtain, it is a lot harder to identify the relevant interest rate for this comparison. In the previ-
ous chapters, it was made clear that safe rates on government bonds or the interbank interest 
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rate are not the right choice when assessing dynamic efficiency, as they do not reflect the cost 
of capital faced by firms. A much more appropriate instrument would be the WACC.  
So far, an analysis of interest and growth rates at a national level using WACC data has not 
been done. This is likely due to the fact that the WACC data are not easy to obtain for this 
kind of examination, as Homburg (2014) points out. The analysis executed in this thesis in-
tends to close this gap and broaden the empirical research conducted in this field so far.  
The objective of this analysis is twofold. The first and more important aim is to evaluate 
whether or not the OECD countries37 + China exhibit signs of overaccumulation using 
WACC data and growth rates. If no signs of overaccumulation are found, this presents a 
strong empirical case against the policy propositions by for example von Weizsäcker (2014) 
and Summers (2014) and support for theories such as Homburg’s (1991, 1992, 2014), that 
overaccumulation is rendered impossible if factors like land are taken into account.  
As explained before, firms usually use a mix of debt and equity financing which result in the 
individual WACC for each firm. It is generally assumed that equity yields a higher return than 
debt financing, which would mean that interest rates paid by companies for loans would have 
to be lower than the WACC. Such interest rates are much easier to obtain than the WACC at a 
national level. Homburg (2014) therefore uses these interest rates as a first test on overaccu-
mulation for the US and the eurozone because they correspond to a lower bound on the 
WACC, in theory. Whether or not this assumption is correct will also be tested in this analysis 
for several eurozone countries and the US. If it holds and the WACC are always higher than 
the interest rates paid by non-financial institutions for debt financing, a first assessment of 
overaccumulation using only interest rates is possible. If the result points to overaccumula-
tion, a further test with the WACC will help clarify the picture. However, if the interest rates 
exceed the growth rate already, then so will the WACC and thus there will be no case for 
overaccumulation. Looking at these easily obtainable interest rates and growth rates can then 
be used as a “pre-test” whether or not the economy grows inefficiently. Evaluating the relia-
bility of such a pre-test is thus the second objective of the analysis.   
                                                          
37 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, USA.  
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3.1.  Data Sources and Calculations 
  
The data used in this thesis was collected from several sources38. It includes data on the 
WACC, the growth rate and in some cases the interest rate paid by non-financial corporations. 
The WACC data was obtained at a semi-annual basis from 30.06.2000-30.06.2014. All other 
values were collected at a monthly or quarterly basis and then converted to represent compa-
rable semi-annual values.  
The countries considered in this analysis are all 34 OECD countries as well as China to exam-
ine a wide variety of big as well as small economies across the globe that are at different stag-
es of their economic development. In addition, data on the aggregates EU1239, the EU1740, 
and OECD + China was considered. The EU12 consists solely of OECD countries for which 
the data was collected. The EU17 includes Malta and Cyprus that are not OECD countries, so 
no WACC data was collected for these two countries. They are thus only reflected in the 
growth rate of the EU17. As these countries play a rather small role in the euroarea and there 
is no reason to assume that their WACC data should differ significantly41 from the other coun-
tries, this should not affect the results to a great extent.  
 
3.1.1.  Growth Rate 
 
For the growth rates, quarterly data on the nominal GDP from the OECD database42 was used, 
more specifically the GDP obtained via the expenditure approach (B1_GE), measured in mil-
lions of national currency at current prices, quarterly levels and seasonally adjusted (measure: 
CQRSA). Quarterly data from the first quarter of 1999 until the second quarter of 2014 was 
taken. The first two quarters of each year were then added to get the GDP of the first half 
year; the quarters III and IV make up the second half year. From these values, a year-over-
year (yoy) calculation yielded the annual growth rates of the economies at six-months-
intervals. The following calculation was used:  
                                                          
38 Bloomberg, ECB, Eurostat, Federal Reserve Board database, OECD, Penn World Tables.   
39 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
40 Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, Spain, Cyprus 
41 Significantly in this context is to mean that they differ enough to affect the general form of the WACC curve for the EU17 countries, e.g. 
pushing it below the growth rate.   
42 Available at http://stats.oecd.org/. Accessed 07/24/2014.  
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g  is the growth rate for the first half year and 
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being the GDP of the first and GDP:II that of the second half of year t .  
 
For some countries quarterly data was not available. This concerns Greece, China, EU12, and 
EU17 for the whole period and Korea and Luxembourg for the year 1999. For Greece, China 
and EU17 as well as Korea and Luxembourg, annual data from the OECD database for the 
GDP was used to calculate the annual growth rate at an interval of one year instead of six 
months. This does not change the results much; it only means that for these calculations the 
growth rate g  does not show as many details of the growth path of the economy. China’s 
GDP for the year 2013 is not yet available. For the EU12 the OECD doesn’t collect any data. 
Instead, data on the time series of annual GDP at current prices (B1GM) for the EU12 area 
from Eurostat43 was used. Again, data starting in 1999 was collected to obtain growth rates 
starting in 2000. 
When determining an average for the entire time frame under consideration, a geometric 
mean was calculated as is the standard procedure when averaging growth rates over a horizon. 
  
3.1.2.  WACC 
 
It was already explained that the WACC are a financial instrument used by firms and there-
fore not available for nations as a whole. There have been some efforts to calculate the cost of 
capital for countries in the past44, but as there were only very few and for different time hori-
zons, they are not sufficient for the analysis conducted in this thesis. Therefore, the WACC 
need to be obtained differently. There are different approaches to doing this. One possibility 
would be to estimate the different elements for the country as a whole, like Friend and To-
                                                          
43 Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.  
44 Krotter (2003) calculates the WACC for all firms in the German DAX, MDAX, and SDAX, and although he does not do this in order to 
derive a national value for the WACC, he presents an average of all firms from 1988-2000 that could be interpreted as a national estimate of 
the WACC. Ando and Auerbach (1988) measure the cost of capital for Japan and the United States from 1967-1983, though they do not use 
the WACC approach. Similar to Krotter, they draw on data from large samples of firms. Friend and Tokutsu (1987) focus on Japan and the 
US economy as well, calculating a measure of the cost of capital – again not according to the standard WACC approach – using estimates for 
the different components from 1962-1984.  
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kutsu (1987). Another would be to approximate the figures using information of many firms 
within a country and calculating an average from this data, either for the elements of the 
WACC formula or for the WACC directly. The former heavily relies on assumptions and es-
timates, while the later incorporates actual data that directly represents firms’ cost of capital. 
In this thesis, the second approach is therefore used and firm data on the WACC is acquired at 
a large scale.  
The WACC data was obtained from the Bloomberg database. The Bloomberg database col-
lects financial and economic data for more than 600.000 companies in 117 countries.45 They 
started collecting the WACC data for companies in the year 2000, which thus constitutes the 
start of the time series under investigation in this thesis. The data from the database was taken 
for two dates each year, the 30th of June and the 31st of December. For each country under 
consideration, the biggest and/or most important stock market was selected and the WACC 
data for all companies in that stock market was collected. The only exception was Italy, for 
which no data could be obtained at all. Table 2 reports the stock market used for each country 
and the number of companies in each of these markets.  
However, WACC data was not available for all companies and not at all times and the size of 
the stock markets vary quite strongly as can be seen in Table 2. Therefore, for some countries 
the time series doesn’t start until later, for example Hungary for which the first data is availa-
ble on 30th June 2002 and at that point only for four companies. Slovenia’s first company 
starts reporting their WACC data at the end of 2003 and it is not until 2008 that all companies 
in the stock market collect the WACC data. For all countries, the number of companies where 
the WACC are reported increases over time. The implications this has on the reliability of the 
data to reflect a country’s WACC will be discussed in Chapter 4.2..  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 http://www.bloomberg.com/enterprise/data/reference-data-services/. 
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Country Stock Market No. of 
members 
First WACC 
data collected 
Australia S&P/ASX 300 297 30.06.2000 
Austria ATX 20 30.06.2000 
Belgium BEL 20 20 30.06.2000 
Canada S&P/TSX Composite Index 251 30.06.2000 
Chile IPSA Index 40 30.06.2000 
Czech Republic CTX Index 14 30.06.2000 
Denmark OMX Copenhagen 20 20 30.06.2000 
Estonia OMX Tallinn Index 16 30.06.2000 
Finland OMX Helsinki All Share Index 130 30.06.2000 
France CAC 40 40 30.06.2000 
Germany DAX, MDAX, SDAX 130 30.06.2000 
Greece Athens Stock Exchange General Index 60 30.06.2000 
Hungary Share Index of Budapest Stock Exchange 14 30.06.2002 
Iceland NASDAQ OMX Iceland 14 31.12.2000 
Ireland ISEQ Overall Index 48 30.06.2000 
Israel TA-100 Index 101 30.06.2000 
Italy ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Japan Nikkei 225 225 30.06.2000 
South Korea KOSPI 762 30.06.2000 
Luxembourg LuxX Index 10 30.06.2000 
Mexico IPC 35 30.06.2000 
Netherlands AEX 25 30.06.2000 
New Zealand NZX All 115 30.06.2000 
Norway OBX Index 25 30.06.2000 
Poland WIG 20 20 30.06.2000 
Portugal PSI 20 20 30.06.2000 
Slovakia SAX Index 7 31.12.2000 
Slovenia SBITOP 8 31.12.2003 
Spain IBEX 35 35 30.06.2000 
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30 30 30.06.2000 
Switzerland SMI 20 30.06.2000 
Turkey ISE-100 Index 99 30.06.2000 
United Kingdom FTSE 100 101 30.06.2000 
USA Russell 1000 1031 30.06.2000 
China CSI 300 300 30.06.2000 
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Source:Bloomberg, Accessed 07/07/2014. 
 
Bloomberg’s own calculation is based on the basic formula (32):  
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 As Sharfman and Fernando (2008) point out, the WACC calculated by Bloomberg may differ 
from other calculations in two aspects. The beta factor is calculated by Bloomberg and pro-
vided on a weekly basis as opposed to e.g. COMPUSTAT’s annual beta. They also use a firm-
specific risk premium that they estimate themselves instead of using, for example, the Fama 
and French (2002) estimate of the risk premium that is used by Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008).  Again, implications will be discussed in Chapter 4.2..   
For each point in time, a simple arithmetic average for all companies within one country was 
calculated. The companies were not weighted but instead were all considered equally for sev-
eral reasons. One of them has to do with the fact that if one would weight the WACC, for ex-
ample, according to the company’s share in the market, this would lead to problems of calcu-
lating the average value when there are no WACC values available for several companies in 
the stock market. As previously stated, the availability of WACC data for each stock market 
varies over time, which would then mean that for almost all periods, the WACC weights 
would have to be recalculated. If that were to be done, the weights would no longer reflect the 
market share properly and consequently they would lose their meaning. This goes for all other 
ways of weighting the WACC with respect to market data. Additionally, not weighting the 
companies allows the average WACC value to reflect the WACC of big or small companies 
to the same degree, which is exactly what one would want them to at a national level. Calcu-
lating arithmetic means for each date then yielded the time series for the WACC of each 
country.  
As with the growth rates, when calculating the average WACC data over the whole horizon 
under consideration a geometric mean was determined to reflect the average WACC for one 
country.  
Table 2 – Stock Markets of OECD countries and China 
Stock markets and number of members for all OECD countries and China considered in this analysis. 
WACC data was collected for all companies in these markets between 30.06.2000 and 30.06.2014, if 
available.    
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3.1.3.  Interest Rates 
 
For the eurozone, interest rates on loans were used, whereas for the United States bond yields 
were obtained. This is owed to the fact that while European firms prefer loan financing, US 
firms favor bond financing, as Homburg (2014) points out.  
The data on the interest rates for the euroarea countries was obtained from the ECB statistical 
data warehouse46. The time series “MIR” (Monetary Financial Institution Interest Rates) was 
filtered for loans to non-financial corporations (sector S11) for all countries in the euroarea. 
The ECB provides a time series for monthly annualized agreed rates for different maturities. 
For this study, only the interest rates for total original maturity were considered. The exact 
series key for each country can be found in Appendix 1. For most countries, this time series 
starts in 2003 when a new calculation of the MIR was introduced. For some countries the time 
series does not start until later.  
For the United States, the H.15 data from the database of the Federal Reserve Board47 was 
obtained. The interest rates used for this study were Moody’s Aaa corporate bond yields, 
which are available at a monthly basis starting in 1919. The Aaa yields were used because 
they correspond to a lower risk premium compared to the Bbb yields. This also means that the 
Bbb yields will be higher than the Aaa yields. Using the Aaa yields thus leads to a stronger 
result if they turn out to exceed the growth rate, because then all rates for companies with a 
lower ranking will be even higher.   
The monthly data had to be converted to semi-annual data. This was again done using a geo-
metric mean calculation.  
 
3.1.4.  Combining countries 
 
                                                          
46 Available at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu. 
47 Available at http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm.  
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In addition to the analysis of single countries, an analysis for the EU12, the EU17 and all 
countries considered (OECD + China) together was carried out. One could have manually 
added the GDP of the countries under consideration and calculated the growth rate from the 
sum of all GDP.  
Instead, the GDP necessary for the calculation of growth rates for the EU12 and EU17 were 
already provided by Eurostat and the OECD, enabling a direct calculation of the growth rates.  
For the WACC data, the calculation was not as straightforward. Instead of simply averaging 
the WACC data of all countries for each point in time using an arithmetic mean, it now makes 
sense to weight the WACC when aggregating all countries. Otherwise a country like Slovenia 
has the same impact on the calculation as the United States, even though the US economy is 
almost 300 times as big as Slovenia’s48 and the data on the WACC for the US is more exten-
sive than the data for Slovenia. Additionally, the growth rates calculated from aggregating the 
GDP values have the effect of weighting each country’s growth rate according to the GDP. 
Hence, one needs to weigh the WACC as well in order to guarantee equal treatment of the 
two rates. 
The countries were weighted according to their economic output, represented by their GDP 
share in the base year 2000 taken from the Penn World Tables49. The Penn World Tables pro-
vide PPP-converted50 data on the GDP of all countries, ensuring that the data is not distorted. 
The GDP of all countries analyzed in this thesis was added and the percentage of each coun-
try’s GDP relative to the total GDP of these countries was equated with the weight. These 
weights were also used when calculating the growth rate for the OECD + China table, as there 
was no aggregate available for the GDP of this area in half-annual intervals.  
The Penn World Tables provide two time series for the GDP in China. For this calculation, 
the China2 time series was used as it is better suited for recent data. In the case of Italy where 
no WACC data could be obtained the interest rate provided by the ECB was used. Naturally, 
for the EU12 and the EU17 time series the weights were recalculated, using only the countries 
under consideration, though Malta and Cyprus were dropped completely from the EU17 
WACC estimate.  
 
                                                          
48 Measured by the PPP-GDP provided by the Penn World Tables for the year 2000.  
49 Available at https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/.  
50 PPP stands for „purchasing power parity“.  
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3.2.  Results 
 
Out of the 35 countries under consideration, only six exhibit signs of overaccumulation when 
comparing the average WACC and the average growth51 rate from 2000-2014. The results for 
these countries will be presented further before moving on to the results for the other coun-
tries, which can be divided into three additional categories. The second category that will be 
presented consists of countries where the WACC exceed the growth rate in almost all periods, 
but the growth rate never crosses the WACC more than once. If interest rates are available, 
they also exceed the growth rate on average. The third category is made up of countries where 
the WACC indicate dynamic efficiency, but the interest rates for non-financial corporations 
suggest inefficiency. The last category encompasses all countries where the WACC on aver-
age indicate dynamic efficiency, but where the growth rate exceeds the WACC several times 
or for long periods of time.  
Selected graphs for each category will be presented as examples. Due to the fact that the aim 
of this thesis is not to provide a complete explanation of the growth behavior and its drivers 
for each economy, detailed descriptions of all of these economies will not be given. An excep-
tion is made for the countries that indicate dynamic inefficiency, because these will be looked 
at more closely in the following discussion. For the other categories, the focus will be on 
common characteristics important for the assessment of dynamic efficiency. Nonetheless, 
graphs for all countries and aggregates can be found in Appendix 2.  
 
3.2.1.  Category I 
 
According to the comparison of WACC and growth rates China, Chile, Estonia, Iceland, Slo-
vakia, and Turkey show signs of overaccumulation as their growth rate exceeds the WACC on 
average. For Estonia and Slovakia the interest rates paid by non-financial corporations i  is on 
average also lower than the growth rate g . Table 3 summarizes the values for the average 
WACC, growth rates, and interest rates, if available.  
                                                          
51 Both geometric means as explained earlier in Chapter 3.1.  
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Source: As described in the text. Own Computation.  
For these countries, the growth rate falls significantly in 2008/2009 and drops below zero in 
all cases but China. Immediately afterward, the growth rates rises again quickly, only to fall 
again within the next year. China is the only country to reach the same growth rate at the end 
of the analyzed period that they had at the beginning in 2000.  
However, for China this is also the lowest level of growth at about 10%, which they reach at 
the beginning of the millennium and then again in 2009 and 2012. During the rest of the peri-
od considered, growth rates are significantly higher, peaking at roughly 23% in 2007. The 
WACC are between 5-8% until the summer of 2008. After that, they rise to a level of 9% and 
have since stayed relatively constant between 9-13%. Except for the years 2009 and 2012, the 
growth rate always exceeds the WACC. Figure 3 shows the case of China as an illustration of 
overaccumulation. Graphs for the other five countries can be found in the Appendix 2.1..  
 
Country 
WACC g  i  
China 8.14 14.46 ̶ 
Chile 7.49 9.54 ̶ 
Estonia 7.74 8.92 4.46 
Iceland 5.74 7.88 ̶ 
Slovakia 5.33 6.78 3.91 
Turkey 8.15 21.01 ̶ 
0
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Table 3 – Category I: Average Data for WACC, Growth Rates, and Interest Rates,   
collected 2000-2014 
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Source: As described in the text. Own Computation. 
Chile starts out with a growth rate slightly above 10% that falls at first but then climbs to over 
18% in 2004. It then decreases for two half-years before peaking slightly above 19%. In 2007, 
it plunges to at first 8% and then even becomes negative in 2008:II and 2009:I. The GDP im-
mediately reverts back to high growth rates (13-16%) before plummeting again in the second 
half of 2011, growing between 5-7% since. The WACC mostly increase from 2000-2014 from 
a level of almost 7% to 10% in 2014, with a small setback between 2011-2013 where they fall 
from 10% to around 8%. The growth rate exceeds the WACC most of the time between 2000 
and 2014. It only falls significantly short of the WACC in 2008:II, 2009:I and since 2011:II.   
Estonia starts out with a fairly high growth rate (15%) that reaches its maximum at slightly 
below 22% in the first half of 2007. In 2008 it drops to 6% in the first half and -3% in the sec-
ond half. In 2009, the growth rate is as low as -14%. The economy recovers fast, reaching a 
growth rate of 8% in the second half of 2010 and even 14% in 2011. Since then the growth 
rate has decreased somewhat and is now at a little over 5%. The WACC stay relatively con-
stant between 5-8% until the second half of 2010, where they skyrocket to over 17% for one 
year. Since the second half of 2011, the WACC have stayed between 9-13%. Prior to 2008, 
the growth rate exceeded the WACC significantly. After 2008, the opposite is the case.  The 
time series for the interest rate doesn’t start until 2008. The interest rate is always lower than 
the WACC and drops slowly from 6% slightly below 3% over the course of 6 years.  
Iceland’s GDP exhibits strong fluctuations, with a growth rate between 14-16% in 2001, 
2004, 2006, and 2008. After each period of strong growth, the growth rates plunges within the 
next one or two periods by at least 4 percentage points. In 2001, it drops from almost 15% to 
less than 3% within a year, from 2008 to 2010 the fall is even more drastic from close to 15% 
to almost -1%. Contrary to the growth rate, the WACC stay comparatively constant between 
4-8% over the entire time series. As opposed to the China, Chile, and Estonia, the WACC are 
on average lower between 2008-2014 (4-5.5%) compared to the period from 2000-2008 (5-
8%). They only exceed the growth rate between 2002:II-2003:II, 2009:I-2011:I, in 2012:II-
2013:I and in 2014:I.  
Figure 3 – China: Empirical Comparison of WACC and Growth Rate, 2000-2014 
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The growth rate in Slovakia starts out fluctuating between 7-13% until 2008 where it drops to 
5% and then to almost -7% in 2009. The recovery starts in 2010 when the growth rate rises 
sharply to about 5%. Since then it has decreased and is currently only a little below 2%.  
 
The WACC start out at 6% and stay relatively constant until the summer of 2008 with the 
exception of the second half of 2001 and the first half of 2002 where the WACC are above 
8%. After 2008, the WACC have mostly declined and reach values between 3-5%. The inter-
est rate for non-financial corporations starting in 2006 is below the WACC for all years but 
2014, where it is 0.23 percentage points higher. From 2006-2008 it is between 4-5.5%, 
whereas after it always stays between 3-4%. The growth rate falls short of the WACC in 
2001:II-2002:I, 2009, and since 2012:I.  
Turkey exhibits the highest growth rates of the entire data set, starting out with a growth rate 
of over 66%. This rate plunges to 40% within a year, and even after climbing again somewhat 
for one year it drops to even lower levels, reaching its minimum in the first half of 2009 with 
a growth rate of -3%. It reverts back to a growth rate between 10-20% but suffers one more 
fall in 2012. The WACC vary in a wide range between 5-13% over the entire time horizon, 
however, there are barely any strong fluctuations and the movement from 6,5% in 2000 to 
13% in 2014 is rather smooth. They exceed the growth rate between 2008:II-2009:II and since 
2013.  
 
3.2.2.  Category II  
 
This category includes all countries where the WACC are almost always greater than the 
growth rate and where the interest rate – if available – is on average also greater than the 
growth rate. This applies to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Neth-
erlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, and the combinations EU12 and EU17. 
Table 4 summarizes the values for the average WACC, growth rate, and interest rate.  
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Country WACC g  i  
Austria 7.11 3.42 3.48 
Belgium 6.92 3.42 3.99 
Denmark 7.65 3.05 ̶ 
France 7.86 2.95 3.85 
Germany 7.52 2.26 4.30 
Italy ̶ 2.27 4.22 
Japan 6.94 -0.31 ̶ 
Netherlands 7.96 3.15 4.03 
Portugal 6.89 2.59 4.60 
Sweden 8.00 3.82 ̶ 
Switzerland 7.75 2.73 ̶ 
UK 8.51 4.26 ̶ 
USA 8.83 4.01 5.42 
EU12 6.48 2.82 4.10 
EU17 6.47 2.87 ̶ 
Source: As described in the text. Own Computation.  
 
For all of these countries, a plunge in the growth rate in 2009 to negative values can be ob-
served. Even before that, the movement of the growth rate shows striking similarities. Prior to 
2009, a dip in the growth rate between 2001 and 2004 is clearly visible. After the crash of 
growth rates in 2009, all countries recover quickly and even reach pre-crash-values in most 
countries. This lasts until 2011 where growth rates begin to plummet again. The rise in growth 
rates in 2010 coincides with a rise in the WACC for all countries except for Portugal, where 
the increase can be observed in 2011. In most of these countries, the WACC reach their max-
imum at this point and then decline again, for some countries slower than for others. Where 
interest rates are available, they remain below the WACC for all countries at all times except 
the USA in the year 2000. In the case of Italy and Portugal, the interest rates also exceed the 
growth rate in all periods. For all other countries, the interest rate sometimes falls short of the 
growth rate. Nevertheless, it is greater than the growth rate on average. Figure 4 shows the 
graph for the EU12 combination, the USA, and Japan. All other countries can be viewed in 
Appendix 2.2..  
Table 4 – Category II: Average Data for WACC, Growth Rates, and Interest Rates, 
collected 2000-2014 
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The EU12 graph, even though it contains data on countries that are not in this category52, 
nicely represents the movement of the curves for all the countries in Europe within this cate-
gory, including countries that are not in the euroarea. As these movements are fairly similar, 
the EU12 was chosen to illustrate the graphs of all European countries. The US economy as 
one of the economies often studied by other authors (see Chapter 2) is also included here. The 
margin between the WACC and the growth rate is clearly visible. In the case of Japan, the 
characteristically low growth rate inherent to the Japanese economy since the “lost decade” in 
the 1990s can be seen nicely53.  
 
 
 
                                                          
52 Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain.  
53 For more on Japan’s “lost decade”, see Hayashi and Prescott (2002). 
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Source: As described in the text. Own Computation. 
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Figure 4 – EU12 / Japan / USA: Empirical Comparison of WACC, Growth Rate, and 
Interest Rate 2000-2014 
 53 
 
3.2.3.  Category III 
 
In the case of Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, and Spain, a look at the WACC and 
the growth rate on average would indicate dynamic efficiency. In contrast, the interest rate on 
loans for non-financial corporations falls short of the growth rate on average, indicating dy-
namic inefficiency. Table 5 presents the average values for WACC, growth rates, and interest 
rates.  
Country WACC g  i  
Finland 6.98 3.35 3.08 
Ireland 7.89 4.7 4.09 
Luxembourg 7.26 5.43 3.38 
Slovenia 7.34 5.42 4.59 
Spain 7.21 4.01 3.81 
Source: As described in the text. Own Computation. 
With respect to the specific evolution of the different rates, the countries differ significantly. 
However, the most important features for this analysis will be pointed out now. All graphs can 
be found in Appendix 2.3., while the case of Spain and Ireland, which are both part of the 
GIIPS54 countries, are also shown in Figure 5.  
Once again, a significant drop in the growth rates to negative values in 2008/2009 can be ob-
served for all countries, Ireland and Luxembourg starting in 2008 and the other countries fol-
lowing in 2009. Growth rates recover after that but begin to drop again; Slovenia, Ireland, and 
Spain reaching negative growth rates once more. With the exception of Luxembourg in 
2011:I, the WACC exceed the growth rate in all countries since 2008:II. The interest rate is 
always lower than the WACC for all countries during the time observed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Common name for Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. During the euro crisis these countries had particularly high public debt 
levels.  
Table 5 – Category III: Average Data for WACC, Growth Rates, and Interest Rates, 
collected 2000-2014 
 54 
 
 
Source: As described in the text. Own Computation. 
 
3.2.4.  Category IV 
 
This category encompasses all countries where the WACC exceed the growth rate on average, 
indicating dynamic efficiency, but the growth rate exceeds the WACC on several occasions or 
for extended periods of time.  
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Figure 5 – Ireland / Spain: Empirical Comparison of WACC, Growth Rate, and Inter-
est Rate 2000-2014 
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These countries are Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Israel, South Ko-
rea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, and the OECD + China analysis. Table 6 gives 
the average WACC, growth rate, and interest rate, if available.  
Country WACC g  i  
Australia 8.22 6.67 ̶ 
Canada 6.92 4.60 ̶ 
Czech Republic 6.79 4.42 ̶ 
Greece 7.43 2.72 5.81 
Hungary 8.13 6.91 ̶ 
Israel 7.26 5.65 ̶ 
South Korea 7.79 6.48 ̶ 
Mexico 8.68 7.84 ̶ 
New Zealand 7.27 5.18 ̶ 
Norway 8.77 6.48 ̶ 
Poland 8.43 6.67 ̶ 
OECD + China 7.79 5.12 ̶ 
 
Source: As described in the text. Own Computation. 
Other than exhibiting WACC that are on average higher than the growth rate, the countries 
behave quite differently. Two characteristics common for almost all countries in this category 
are noteworthy. With the exception of Israel in 2012:II and Mexico from 2010-2012, the 
WACC always exceed the growth rate after 2008:II. Once again, the financial crisis in 
2008/2009 can be clearly seen in almost all countries, Israel being the only notable country 
showing no signs of recession. As an illustration, the graphs for Greece as a special case and 
for the OECD + China analysis are also depicted in Figure 6. Greece shows an unusually high 
value of over 39% for the WACC in 2011:II. The graph for all countries as a whole shows 
that the WACC exceed the growth rate almost all the time except for 2000 and 2004. The gap 
between the WACC and the growth rate becomes especially visible during 2008/2009 and 
remains larger after the crash than before. All other graphs can be found in Appendix 2.4..  
 
Table 6 – Category IV: Average Data for WACC, Growth Rates, and Interest Rates, 
collected 2000-2014 
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Source: As described in the text. Own Computation. 
3.2.5.  Summary 
 
To sum up the results from the different countries, it can be seen that almost all countries ex-
hibit a rapid fall in the growth rate as a result of the financial crisis in 2008/2009. Even though 
growth rates quickly recovered, they have declined again ever since. In contrast to the often 
fluctuating growth rate, the WACC have remained relatively constant. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 6, which combines all countries under observation, there was a slight increase of the aver-
age WACC over the time period considered. The average growth rate exceeds the average 
WACC in only 6 countries.  
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Figure 6 – Greece / OECD Countries + China: Empirical Comparison of WACC, 
Growth Rate, and Interest Rate 2000-2014 
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Chapter 4: Discussion  
 
The reason for the comparison of the WACC and the growth rates was to investigate the dy-
namic efficiency properties of the OECD countries + China. Recently, two leading econo-
mists – von Weizsäcker (2014) and Summers (2013, 2014) – have suggested that some of 
these economies display characteristics that call for government intervention. They propose 
public debt to fix problems inherent to the economies. However, this policy is never feasible 
if the economy is on a dynamically efficient growth path. A “free lunch” as proposed by 
Summers (2014) is only attainable in a state of inefficiency. Otherwise the debt cannot be 
rolled over indefinitely: it has to be served sooner or later. It is therefore necessary to establish 
if the economies in question are in fact inefficient or not, which is equivalent to saying that 
the growth rate surpasses the interest rate – represented here by the WACC – in the limit. For 
empirical assessments, the average rate serves the purpose of indicating the eventual behavior 
under the assumption of ergodicity, meaning that the average behavior represents the behavior 
over the entire horizon. The last chapter presented the results from this analysis. A discussion 
of these findings and the feasibility of the pre-test will now be conducted.  
4.1.  Are the OECD Countries and China dynamically inefficient? 
 
A first look at the data clearly shows that for some countries, the growth rate exceeds the 
WACC on average, indicating dynamic inefficiency according to the criterion described in 
Chapter 1.3.. This applies to 6 out of the 38 examinations, just a little over 15% of the sample. 
For all other economies as well as the EU12 and EU17, overaccumulation can be rejected. 
Combining all countries yields the same result, indicating that the OECD countries + China as 
a whole grow efficiently.  
One result that is noteworthy before taking a closer look at the different countries is the fact 
that the average WACC over the time period considered are fairly similar across countries, 
ranging from 5.33% to 8.83% with an overall average of 7.79%. This supports a claim by 
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) that the marginal cost of capital are essentially equal across coun-
tries. The way they derive this result is also interesting for the analysis in this thesis.  
They first use a simple estimate of the marginal product of capital by employing data from the 
National Accounts and divide an estimate of the capital share of the GDP by the capital stock. 
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This is very similar to some of the measures discussed in Chapter 2.2.. They find that with 
this estimate, there is indeed a visible difference between developing and developed countries. 
However, after adjusting their estimates for land and other natural resources as well as price 
differences between capital and consumption goods, this difference all but vanishes. The fact 
that the average WACC across countries do not differ to a great extent not only supports their 
results, but furthermore stresses the importance of excluding land data from the calculation of 
the return on capital and including other adjustments, should National Accounts data be used. 
Failing to do so will inevitably bias the results and potentially lead to a wrong assessment. 
The WACC being fairly similar across countries also suggests that the marginal productivity 
of capital is independent of the development stage of an economy and will stay roughly the 
same as a country advances. What is more, there is no apparent correlation between the 
movement of the WACC and the movement of, for example, government bond yields or the 
interbank rates. This underlines the inadequacy of using the latter to argue about dynamic 
efficiency.  
For the remainder of the discussion it is important to keep in mind that for dynamic efficien-
cy, only the eventual behavior of WACC and growth rate decides whether or not an economy 
is actually inefficient. Since the analysis not only focuses on developed countries but also a 
variety of emerging market economies, lessons drawn from the former might therefore be 
applicable to the latter. This being said, the different categories already presented in Chapter 
3.2. will now be examined further. 
Separating the countries into groups according to their behavior quickly shows a certain pat-
tern. All countries in category II, the countries that show no sign of inefficiency with respect 
to their WACC and interest rates, are industrialized and advanced economies, whereas the 
countries in category I are categorized by e.g. the IMF as mostly emerging markets or frontier 
markets. Category III and IV consist of both emerging and advanced economies.  
Category I contains countries that exhibit signs of overaccumulation, so public debt could in 
these cases make everyone better off – in theory. However, before this is taken as a direct 
invitation to accumulate more debt, a closer look at the economies in question is important. 
As mentioned before, the WACC data do not differ much across countries and stay relatively 
constant over time. This uncovers the growth rate as the driving factor behind inefficient 
growth paths. If the WACC constantly remain at a high level over time, dynamic inefficiency 
only becomes possible due to high growth rates.  
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For the moment, the countries under consideration in category I seem to have accumulated too 
much capital. On the condition that these economies were to stay in this state indefinitely, 
public debt would be feasible. If on the other hand growth rates can be expected to decrease 
and fall below the WACC sooner or later, the accumulated debt will instead turn into a burden 
for the economy. An assessment taking expected future developments into consideration is 
especially crucial in these cases.   
One of the main characteristics of emerging markets is that they exhibit high growth rates 
compared to advanced economies. They are transitioning from being developing countries to 
developed countries, and the introduction of (better) infrastructure and stability, especially on 
the credit markets, boosts economic growth. Most of the now advanced economies have also 
undergone this process several times. Especially for European countries, high growth rates 
after World War II can be observed. An analysis similar to the one conducted here might have 
indicated dynamic inefficiency for these countries several decades back. However, over the 
years, economic growth slowed. This behavior is also expected from emerging countries in 
the future.55 China, Chile, Estonia, Slovakia, and Turkey – five of the six countries that show 
signs of overaccumulation – are officially recognized as emerging market countries by the 
IMF World Economic Outlook of 2008 (IMF (2008)). The World Economic Outlook of 2014 
(IMF (2014)) characterizes Estonia and Slovakia as advanced economies. As they were still 
classified as emerging markets six years earlier, this distinguishes them from Iceland which 
has long been among the advanced countries.  
Therefore, for all countries but Iceland, it can be expected fairly certain that the high growth 
rates will decline in the future, a trend that is already visible in Turkey, Estonia, and Slovakia, 
where growth rates have decreased significantly compared to their level in 2000. Before in-
troducing new debt programs in these countries because they show signs of inefficiency now, 
one should therefore wait a few years and repeat the analysis of interest and growth rates with 
more data. If the recent trend continues, a new assessment will quite likely produce a different 
result.  
If or when this downward trend in growth rates will reach China and Chile is unclear. Eichen-
green et al. (2012) investigate former fast-growing countries and the nature of their slow-
downs to draw conclusions for currently fast-growing economies, especially China.  
                                                          
55 The dynamics of economic catch-up have been famously investigated by Gerschenkron (1962). It is inevitable that at some point – at the 
latest when there is nothing more to catch up to – important drivers behind this type of growth will weaken significantly. Continued high 
growth is not achievable forever, see also Eichengreen et al. (2012, p. 43).  
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They find that significant slowdowns in the growth rate can be observed after the economy 
has reached a certain threshold in per capita income56, and that in the case of China this 
threshold will be reached within the next years. Therefore, growth rates that exceed the 
WACC do not necessarily mean that raising public debt now is a feasible option. A conserva-
tive approach expecting lower growth rates would indeed suggest the opposite.  
The only curious case is Iceland, an advanced economy with a high growth rate between 2004 
and 2009. In this case, assuming that Iceland will revert back to reaching high growth rates 
once it fully recovers from the Great Recession, public debt seems like a feasible option. 
However, as a result of the economic crisis Iceland was already forced to raise the national 
debt level. The public debt relative to GDP is currently at over 80%57, which is a substantial 
increase from the debt level since the beginning of the millennium, during which it stayed 
between 20-40%. Before considering raising the debt any further, the effect of the recent raise 
should be awaited.  
To sum up, evidence for dynamic inefficiency could be found for a few countries in the sam-
ple. At a first glance, this might suggest that overaccumulation is indeed a problem that has to 
be addressed in the form of public debt. Interestingly, this is not necessarily true. Even in the 
cases where a comparison of interest and growth rates would at this point indicate dynamic 
inefficiency, a policy encouraging higher debt levels is not advisable if a decline in growth 
rates is expected in the long run. Even in Homburg’s (1991, 1992, 2014) land model the inter-
est rate can fall short of the growth rate at times. Eventually, it will always be above the 
growth rate and ensure dynamic efficiency. The observation of seemingly inefficient econo-
mies thus does not invalidate his claim. The other categories will now be investigated to see 
what additional insights can be taken from them.  
Most of the big economies in Europe as well as the United States and Japan can be found in 
category I. There is no emerging or developing economy among these countries, who demon-
strate a striking similarity in their WACC and growth rate movements. The WACC are well 
above the growth rate over the entire period considered with only a few exceptions. The be-
havior of advanced economies is especially interesting because it is the closest estimation to a 
steady state that can be observed. Assuming that emerging market countries will follow a sim-
ilar development and seeing that the countries in category II are clearly far from overaccumu-
lation thus suggests that in the long run, inefficient allocations are unlikely.  
                                                          
56 $US 17000 in 2005 constant international prices.  
57 Source: OECD.stat.org. Effective September 2014.  
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The fact that these economies behave so similarly strengthens this proposition. This finding is 
in favor of Homburg’s (1991, 1992, 2014) land argument that rules out the possibility of inef-
ficiency in the limit. It is also interesting to note that with the USA, Germany, and Japan, 
countries that have been feared to have accumulated too much capital by e.g. Summers 
(2014), von Weizsäcker (2014), and Geerolf (2013), respectively, show no indication of such 
behavior. Von Weizsäcker’s (2014) reasoning is that public debt is necessary because the real 
rate of interest has become negative in the OECD countries + China, as has been discussed in 
Chapter 2.2.. He attributes this to a longer retirement period and resulting higher savings, a 
development inherent to the rich countries. Therefore, public debt in these countries is needed 
to absorb these excess savings. As has already been discussed, raising the public debt is only 
feasible if the economy is in a state of dynamic inefficiency. If one followed von Weizsäck-
er’s (2014) reasoning, rich western countries would especially need to accumulate public 
debt, because rising pension entitlements play a major role in these economies. However, it is 
precisely these countries that the comparison of WACC and growth rates clearly identifies as 
efficient. Raising public debt would thus have a negative welfare effect instead of a positive 
one and reasonable policy implications would strongly discourage debt schemes. As von 
Weizsäcker’s (2014) theory cannot easily be verified, while the efficiency analysis conducted 
in this thesis relies on real data, raising public debt does not seem to be a suitable option for 
the rich countries across the globe.  
Category IV contains a mix of advanced and emerging economies. According to the IMF 
(2014), Hungary, Mexico, and Poland are categorized as emerging and developing economies, 
while the rest of the countries in this group belong to the advanced economies. Out of these, 
the Czech Republic was labeled to be an emerging economy in 2008 (IMF (2008)), similar to 
Estonia and Slovakia. The comparison of WACC data and growth rates confirms dynamic 
efficiency when looking at the rates on average. Yet, the WACC are not strictly greater than 
the growth rate over the entire horizon, so that looking at shorter periods of time, one might 
suspect these countries to be dynamically inefficient. This stresses the importance of looking 
at the data over the longest time frame possible. The longer the period under examination, the 
more reliable the results are in representing the actual state of the economy. With the excep-
tion of Mexico and Israel, the WACC exceeded the growth rate over the last years since the 
crash in all countries of category IV. There is no trend for the future development of the 
growth rates. Most countries have exhibited high growth rates prior to the crash despite being 
advanced economies. It remains to be seen whether or not they return to these levels, similar 
to the case of Iceland.  
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Nevertheless, the data suggests that these countries are dynamically efficient and that there-
fore, public debt is not a policy that should be pursued. Additionally, these countries show 
that even though the growth rate can exceed the interest rate over several periods, overall effi-
ciency is ensured.   
One country out of this group that requires a closer look is Greece. In 2011:II, the WACC 
skyrocket to a level of almost 40% and instantly fall to the lowest level observed between 
2000 and 2014 (4.28%). A look at the WACC data shows that out of the 60 companies con-
sidered, 15 firms exhibit WACC over 15% in that half-year. Some of these are higher than 
100%, one company reaches almost 350% (Diagnostic & Therapeutic Center of Athens) and 
another over 390% (Elgeka SA). These 15 companies come from very different backgrounds 
and the WACC immediately drop to low levels after the surge. There is no apparent explana-
tion why these values are so unreasonably high. Whether or not this behavior is related to the 
economic crisis or another development is left to another investigation with a stronger focus 
on the Greek economy.  
The last group to be discussed is category III. For these countries, the WACC suggest dynam-
ic efficiency, while the interest rates point to inefficiency. If it were not for this distinction, all 
the countries in this group would be counted to category IV and the interpretation of the find-
ings would be accordingly. Similarly, it is very possible that if interest rate data on the coun-
tries in category IV is obtained, it might suggest inefficient growth for these economies. 
However, as was already discussed, the WACC are a better estimate of the cost of capital for 
firms and therefore the relevant data for the assessment. The analysis thus implies that dynam-
ic efficiency can be assumed for these countries, as well as for the countries in category II and 
IV.  
More importantly, this result shows that the pre-test that was suggested at the beginning of the 
last chapter has to be taken with caution. In the case of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, the US, and the EU12 aggregate, the pre-test gives the same 
indication as the WACC. This result is in favor of using the pre-test. To be sure, it cannot be 
used to definitively determine whether or not an economy is efficient, because it might lead to 
the wrong results, as can be seen from the countries in category III. Nevertheless, it should not 
be rejected completely. One of the conditions for the test to work was that the WACC actually 
always exceed the interest rates on loans by non-financial corporations.  
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This is consistent with the data, for the WACC almost always exceed the interest rate over the 
entire horizon, and usually by a visible margin. The only exceptions to this are Greece in 
2012/2013, Slovakia in 2014, and the USA in 2000, where the interest rate is slightly greater 
than the WACC.  
Considering that the interest rate data is more readily available than the WACC data, using 
the interest rate for a first assessment of the efficiency dynamics of an economy proves to be 
quite useful. Only when dynamic inefficiency is suggested by the data, a further investigation 
based on WACC data is necessary. If the interest rates point to efficient behavior, so will the 
WACC. This test is quickly undertaken and able to save researchers a lot of time if they are 
only interested in potentially inefficient countries. On the other hand, if the aim is to examine 
the behavior of an economy more closely, a direct look at the WACC data constitutes a better 
choice, as some movements that can be observed using WACC data remain hidden when in-
terest rates are used. An example of this will now be provided.   
The difference between the WACC and the growth rate increased drastically for almost all 
countries during 2009, reflecting the Great Recession. Homburg (2014) already found this to 
be true using interest rates for non-financial corporations for the euroarea and Moody’s Aaa 
bond yields for the US. He further explains that this led to a large number of private and sov-
ereign defaults as a result of tighter budget constraints. Looking at the more accurate WACC 
data instead of the interest rate not only confirms his result, but paints an even clearer picture 
of what happened afterward. For the aggregate EU12, Homburg’s graph shows that the inter-
est rate dropped during the recession and then stayed relatively constant. The surge in the 
growth rate following the Great Recession then reduced the gap very fast. For the US, the 
growth rate even exceeded the interest rate for a short time after 2010. Looking at the Europe-
an countries in category II one by one instead of the aggregate, the growth rate exceeded the 
interest rate for several countries in 2010 and sometimes even in 2011.  
According to the same argument used during the recession, one might think that this opposite 
movement should decrease pressure on the budget somewhat. However, after the crisis this 
was not observed. As Summers (2013, 55:30 h) points out, one would normally expect higher 
growth rates than usual after a recession due to the GDP trying to catch up to its potential. 
And indeed, growth rates rose again for a short time after the crisis, but they did not even ex-
ceed the level prior to the crisis and then began to decline again slightly. Looking at the 
WACC gives one possible explanation. For most countries, the WACC rose together with the 
growth rate or a little later.  
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This was a decrease from the gap observed in 2009, but it was still an even higher differential 
than before the Great Recession for most countries, continuing to exert pressure on the debt 
service. During the second recession wave that started in most countries after 2010 the gap 
rose again, tightening budget constraints once more. This may possibly explain why most of 
these countries still struggle from the recession several years after the crash of 2009.  
A reason for the increase in the WACC could stem from an increase in perceived risk, mir-
rored in higher risk premia. This would also explain why the upward movement lagged be-
hind a couple periods, as it always takes time for the markets to adjust to such changes. A 
more thorough explanation of why the WACC rose the way they did will need to be left to 
another analysis with a stronger focus on the nature of the WACC.  
To sum up the results of the assessment, a short comparison with other examinations already 
mentioned in this thesis is useful. The big advantage of this method of assessing dynamic ef-
ficiency is that unlike the criterion used by Abel et al. (1989) and Geerolf (2013) that needs to 
be positive in all periods, it allows the interest rate to fall short of the growth rate for some 
periods without jeopardizing dynamic efficiency. Due to the strong conditions that need to be 
fulfilled using the dividend criterion by Abel et al. (1989), Geerolf’s (2013) results after up-
dating the data for land data and entrepreneurial income showed that inefficiency could not be 
ruled out for a lot of the countries also covered in this analysis. For the countries considered 
by Abel et al. (1989) in their original paper, this was in fact a change for the worse, as they 
had attested dynamic efficiency for these countries. The comparison of WACC and growth 
rates conducted in this analysis therefore reestablishes Abel et al.’s (1989) result, though with 
significantly lower requirements. Using the dividend criterion, Geerolf’s (2013) results re-
main unsatisfactory, because overaccumulation cannot be rejected for almost all countries 
under consideration. This applies to Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and the USA. The analysis of WACC and growth rate data is able 
to give a definite answer to the question of dynamic efficiency: None of these economies are 
in danger of overaccumulation. In direct contrast to the results of this analysis, Geerolf (2013, 
p. 2) finds Japan and South Korea to be “unambiguously inefficient” and claims that Australia 
and Canada are prone to overaccumulation. A comparison of WACC and growth data yields 
no support for this judgment, especially concerning Japan, the country showing probably the 
clearest case of dynamic efficiency among all countries considered in this thesis. Instead, the 
analysis even finds support for the argument that dynamic inefficiency is a phenomenon that 
will unlikely persist in the long run.  
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However, possible objections can be made to the results of this analysis with respect to the 
reliability of the data used. This issue will be addressed next.  
4.2.  Limitations and Reliability 
 
The criterion used in this assessment relies on the behavior of interest and growth rates in the 
limit. Due to a lack of perfect foresight in reality, any analysis conducted according to this 
criterion is not able to provide a definitive answer to the question of dynamic efficiency for 
any country, so the results should be assessed conservatively. Still, they are a good indicator 
of the current state of the different economies, and if one assumes that the rates are ergodic, 
the results obtained from the analysis should also hold in general. Nevertheless, the time hori-
zon considered is rather short, covering only the years from 2000-2014. In order to reassess 
and possibly strengthen the findings, another analysis covering 30-40 years or even longer 
would be desirable. Unfortunately, this was not possible at this point as the WACC data by 
Bloomberg are not available before 2000 and other databases do not collect the data to this 
extent yet. A more extensive analysis thus has to be left for future research.  
The stock markets used for the collection of the WACC differ in size, reaching from 7 com-
panies (Slovakia) to over 1000 (USA). The size of the stock market is not correlated to the 
size of the economy per se. For Finland and Germany, two very different countries, 130 com-
panies are used, while for France, which is smaller than Germany but bigger than Finland, 
only 40 companies are taken into consideration. South Korea’s WACC are calculated using 
over 750 companies, while Canada – a country with a similar PPP-GDP in 2000 according to 
the Penn World Tables – only uses 251 companies. The numbers for all stock markets can be 
taken from Table 2. It could be argued that due to the asymmetric treatment of the different 
countries, the WACC data calculated from the individual companies are more reliable for 
countries for which more companies were used. Another problem that adds to this is that val-
ues are missing for many years and many companies across all countries. This weighs espe-
cially hard on those countries that have a smaller pool of companies to begin with. However, 
these two issues affect the reliability of the data in different ways.  
The difference in the size of the stock market intuitively leads one to assume that the data for 
e.g. the Netherlands with 25 companies is not as good an indicator as the data for the USA 
with over 1000 values.  
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This stems from the common rule that the larger the sample size, the better the estimate of the 
value in question. It is generally correct that a larger sample size enhances the accuracy of the 
approximation. This is especially crucial for random variables. Essentially, the WACC of the 
companies listed in the stock market are not random, but rather express a systematic function, 
meaning that the marginal benefit from more companies should decrease faster. Additionally, 
there has already been a selection process of data by choosing to only consider data from cer-
tain stock markets. A high diversification of industries within the stock markets adds to the 
robustness of the data against shocks to just one branch of the economy. The fact that the 
WACC data is on average quite similar for most countries independent of the sample size 
supports the view that the different sizes of the stock markets do not invalidate the data. As an 
example, even though the sample size of the Netherlands and the USA differs considerably, 
the average WACC are not that different at 7.96% and 8.83%, respectively. This does in no 
way mean that the sample size is irrelevant and that the values from 7 companies in Slovakia 
are as accurate as the numbers from 762 companies in South Korea. How many companies 
are needed to get the best estimate is unclear. One might not need 1000 companies for each 
country, and for many countries this amount of data would be difficult to obtain anyhow. On 
the other hand, too few will most likely not be enough to reach the diversification needed to 
represent the economy as a whole. Therefore, the data for countries with a small stock market 
should be taken with caution, as should the insights from the analysis.  
To summarize, the fact that for some countries the WACC are determined from a smaller 
sample size than for others does not overthrow the results as long as the number of companies 
is sufficiently large, meaning that they adequately represent the economy. The striking simi-
larity of the WACC across the countries underpins this assumption.  
In contrast to varying sample size, the missing values truly pose a problem for the analysis, 
because they reduce the sample size further, which leads the numbers of values to fall to in-
sufficient levels for some countries.  For all countries, the number of companies reporting the 
WACC increases over time. For the countries with smaller stock markets, almost all compa-
nies are assigned WACC values for the last couple periods. Generally, the WACC data are 
more complete for advanced economies than for the emerging countries.  
Some of the estimations of the WACC are derived from just very few companies; in extreme 
cases they even reflect just one company for several periods. This is for example the case for 
Slovakia for the first two and a half years and Iceland for the first year and a half. By the end 
of 2013, only 10 out of the 14 companies in Iceland report WACC data.  
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For Slovakia, all seven companies report WACC for the past four years. However, this num-
ber is still very low. Therefore, the estimates for the first periods might not reflect the cost of 
capital as well for the country as a whole. The results for these two countries – which were 
both found to display signs of overaccumulation – could therefore not be accurate. For some 
of the countries, the number of companies reporting the WACC is limited over the whole pe-
riod considered, so the estimates for these countries are especially prone to distortion. These 
countries are Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Slove-
nia. For most of the other countries with data deficiencies, the number of available WACC 
data reaches a critical value after a few years.58 Therefore, the exact shape of the WACC data 
is not always best represented by the stock market approximation and the results for these 
countries should be assessed cautiously. A more accurate collection of the WACC data for 
these countries is left for further research when more complete datasets are available.  
One last remark towards the reliability of the data concerns the fact that Bloomberg estimates 
the WACC themselves, using risk premia and betas that are calculated by Bloomberg. Any 
bias in the Bloomberg data automatically translates into distortions in the analysis using this 
data. Still, since Bloomberg is the only database supplying WACC data on the scale needed 
for the analysis of this research, this compromise was necessary. This does not mean that the 
data are actually distorted. Sharfman and Fernando (2008) used several calculations of the 
WACC in their analysis, among them the Bloomberg estimate, and did not find significant 
differences in the implications from using the various WACC measures. Hence, there is no 
reason to believe why the implications drawn from the Bloomberg WACC should vary from 
WACC calculations obtained using other standard risk premia and beta values.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
58 In the following list, the year in parenthesis corresponds to the year when the WACC were determined from at least 20 companies. Coun-
tries that are not mention in this list are calculated from more than 20 companies over the entire horizon: Austria (2006), Belgium (2010), 
Denmark (2006), France (2001), Greece (2001), Ireland (2006), New Zealand (2002), Netherlands (2004), Norway (2005), Poland (2010), 
Portugal (2008), Spain (2001), Switzerland (2002), China (2002). The critical value of 20 was chosen owing to the fact that the major stock 
markets for many countries (e.g. Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland) only encompass 20 companies. As was already mentioned, the similari-
ty of the WACC data for these countries suggests that they are a good estimate for the national level, even if they are from just 20 companies. 
Though a higher number of companies would increase the accuracy of the estimate, 20 companies seem to be sufficient for a first assess-
ment.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS AND OUTLOOK 
 
“Public spending is the easiest of all recovery methods, and therein lies its danger.” 
Alvin Hansen, 1939 
 
Are major economies overaccumulating capital, enabling a “free lunch”? This thesis investi-
gated this question and for most countries, the answer seems to be no. In order to address this 
problem, an overview of the theoretical background on dynamic inefficiency as well as a cri-
terion to assess it was given. The possibility of Ponzi schemes in overaccumulating econo-
mies was dealt with and an extension to the Diamond model by Homburg (1991, 1992, 2014) 
that includes land which renders overaccumulation impossible was presented. The second 
chapter described a sample of empirical investigations conducted so far and analyzed the dif-
ferent criteria and interest rates used with respect to applicability and reliability. From these 
results, a new criterion was derived that is based on a comparison of the WACC as a proxy for 
the cost of capital and the growth rate of nations. The WACC had to be calculated from a 
large sample of firm data within each country to obtain a national estimate of the WACC. In 
order to get as extensive an assessment as possible, the analysis was conducted for all OECD 
countries plus China. In addition, the feasibility of a test with the more readily available inter-
est rates on loans for non-financial corporations was considered and found to be practical, 
though the results have to be considered carefully, as they do not always reach the same result 
as the WACC.  
For future research, it remains to be hoped that data on the WACC will continue to be collect-
ed extensively by Bloomberg or other databases, so that another analysis similar to the one 
presented here can be conducted later on. A less accurate but still possible assessment at this 
point would be to use the interest data on loans to non-financial corporations over the past 
decades. Unfortunately, this data is also not attainable for all countries reaching as far back as 
necessary59 to cover several decades. Nevertheless, for the countries where these values are 
available, an analysis could complement the results deduced here and provide further insights. 
However, in conducting such an analysis it is important to note that if these rates are used and 
a country is found to be inefficient, this does not necessarily mean that this would also apply 
using the WACC measure. If, on the other hand, the criterion points to efficiency, then this 
will a fortiori hold using WACC data.  
                                                          
59 For example, the German Bundesbank has published a „Zinsstatistik“ (Interest Rate Statistics) that collects interest rates from 06.1967-
06.2003, after which it was replaced by the MFI statistics. However, the interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations and entrepre-
neurs only goes back to November 1996, yielding little additional insights to the analysis conducted with the WACC starting in 2000.  
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In summary, the evidence from this analysis suggests that the hypothesis of major economies 
being able to raise public debt at no cost is unfounded. With the exception of Chile, Estonia, 
Slovakia, Turkey, and Iceland, dynamic efficiency can be confirmed for all OECD econo-
mies, while China also displays symptoms of dynamic inefficiency. Among the advanced and 
major economies of the world, a change to a dynamically inefficient growth path seems un-
likely. As these countries best approximate steady state behavior, the emerging countries can 
largely be expected to follow a similar growth pattern. A result of this behavior would be 
lowered growth rates, while the WACC seem to not be affected by the development stage of a 
country as much. This would in turn imply that all emerging economies will eventually escape 
the stage in which growth rates are higher than the cost of capital. Due to the fact that only the 
eventual behavior of an economy matters in the assessment of dynamic efficiency, this sup-
ports the view that a representative competitive economy will always converge to an efficient 
growth path, including the economies that exhibit signs of overaccumulation at the moment. 
This result endorses the existence of a mechanism such as described by Homburg (1991, 
1992, 2014) that prevents economies from accumulation too much capital.  
The findings of this analysis strongly oppose the view proposed by Summers (2013, 2014) 
and von Weizsäcker (2014) that countries with low interest rates should accumulate more 
debt. A higher debt in an efficiently functioning economy can never increase welfare, but only 
strain the economy by having to serve the debt later on. Thus, the possibility of a “free lunch” 
for countries like the USA or Germany seems like a far-fetched dream in the light of a com-
parison of interest and growth rates. Granted, public spending can stimulate the economy dur-
ing a time of recession, and during a time when interest rates on government debt are low, it is 
a cheap option. Nevertheless, Hansen (1939) is right in pointing out the limits of such tempt-
ing measures, because a higher debt level can easily burden the economy once interest rates 
begin to rise again. The economies currently profiting from such low rates should therefore 
not pursue a strategy of raising public debt levels, but rather utilize them in the consolidation 
of the national finances.  
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APPENDIX 
1. Series Keys for the time series for interest rates 
Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu 
Country Series Key Data Availability 
Austria MIR.M.AT.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Belgium MIR.M.BE.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Estonia MIR.M.EE.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2008 – 05.2014  
Euro area60 MIR.M.U2.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Finland MIR.M.FI.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
France MIR.M.FR.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Germany MIR.M.DE.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Greece MIR.M.GR.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Ireland MIR.M.IE.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Italy MIR.M.IT.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Luxembourg MIR.M.LU.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Netherlands MIR.M.NL.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Portugal MIR.M.PT.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
Slovakia MIR.M.SK.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2006 – 05.2014  
Slovenia MIR.M.SI.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2007 – 05.2014 
Spain MIR.M.ES.B.A20.A.R.A.2240.EUR.O 01.2003 – 05.2014 
 
2. Empirical Comparison of  WACC, Growth Rates, and Interest Rates 
for all OECD Countries, China, EU12, EU17, and OECD+China 
2.1. Category I  
 
                                                          
60 Changing composition.  
0
5
10
15
20
25
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
China
WACC g
 79 
 
 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Chile
WACC g
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Estonia
WACC g i
 80 
 
 
 
  
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Iceland
WACC g
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Slovakia
WACC g i
 81 
 
 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Turkey
WACC g
 82 
 
2.2. Category II 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Austria
WACC g i
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Belgium
WACC g i
 83 
 
 
 
 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Denmark
WACC g
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
France
WACC g i
 84 
 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Germany
WACC g i
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Italy
g i
 85 
 
 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Japan
WACC g
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Netherlands
WACC g i
 86 
 
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Portugal
WACC g i
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Sweden
WACC g
 87 
 
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Switzerland
WACC g
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
United Kingdom
WACC g
 88 
 
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
USA
WACC g i
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
EU 12*
WACC g i*Excluding WACC of Italy
 89 
 
 
 
2.3. Category III 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
EU 17*
WACC g
*Excluding WACC of Italy, Malta, 
and Cyprus
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Finland
WACC g i
 90 
 
 
 
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Ireland
WACC g i
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Luxembourg
WACC g i
 91 
 
 
 
 
 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Slovenia
WACC g i
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Spain
WACC g i
 92 
 
2.4. Category IV 
 
 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Australia
WACC g
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Canada
WACC g
 93 
 
 
 
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Czech Republic
WACC g
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Greece
WACC g i
 94 
 
 
 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Hungary
WACC g
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Israel
WACC g
 95 
 
 
  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
South Korea
WACC g
-5
0
5
10
15
20
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Mexico
WACC g
 96 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
New Zealand
WACC g
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Norway
WACC g
 97 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Poland
WACC g
-2,0
0,0
2,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
10,0
12,0
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
All countries*
WACC g
*China + OECD Countries excluding 
Italy
